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Enemy Aliens
David Cole*
Come on, let us deal wisely with them; lest they multiply, and it come to pass,
that, when there falleth out any war, they join also unto our enemies, and fight
against us, and so get them up out of the land.

Exodus 1:10
To those who pit Americans against immigrants and citizens against noncitizens, to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty,
my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national
unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies,
and pause to America's friends.

Attorney General
John Ashcroft
Dec. 6, 20011

I. INTRODUCTION
On January 24, 2002, the United States military transported John Walker
Lindh, a young American raised in Marin County, California, and captured
with the Taliban on the battlefields of Afghanistan, to Alexandria, Virginia,
where he was to be tried in a civilian criminal court for conspiring to kill
Americans. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer announced that "the great
strength of America is he will now have his day in court." 2 At the same time,

::: Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I benefited from comments of many
colleagues in connection with presentations of this paper at workshops and forums at
Amherst College, Georgetown University Law Center, Howard Law School, University of
Pittsburgh Law School, Stanford Law School, the Supreme Court Historical Society, Wayne
State University, Wellesley College, and the University of Washington. Matthew Kilby and
Jihee Suh provided invaluable research assistance.
1. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Policy, 106th Cong. (Dec.
6, 2001) (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft).
2. Katharine Q. Seelye, Walker Is Returned to U.S. and Will Be in Court Today, N.Y.
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the military was holding 158 foreign-born Taliban and AI Qaeda prisoners at a
military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 8-foot-by-8-foot chain-link cages.3
A widely circulated press photo depicted the prisoners bound and shackled,
with bags covering their heads and eyes, kneeling on the ground before U.S.
soldiers.4 President George W. Bush announced that he had categorically
determined that the Guantanamo detainees were not entitled to the protections
accorded prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions, and Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld dismissed concerns about their treatment with the
assertion that it was better than the treatment the Taliban and AI Qaeda
accorded their prisoners.5 Two months earlier, the President had issued a
military order providing that AI Qaeda members and other noncitizens could be
tried by military tribunals, in which the military would act as prosecutor, judge,
jury, and executioner, without any appeal to a civilian court. 6
The difference between the treatment afforded John Walker Lindh and his
fellow Taliban and AI Qaeda prisoners held on Guantanamo rested on the fact
that Lindh was, as the press nicknamed him, "the American Taliban." When
the Attorney General announced the charges against Lindh, a reporter asked
why Lindh was being tried in an ordinary criminal court rather than before a
military tribunal. The Attorney General explained that because Lindh was a
United States citizen, he was not subject to the military tribunals created by
President Bush's order.? As a purely legal matter, the president could have
made U.S. citizens subject to military commissions; citizens have been tried in
military tribunals before, and the Supreme Court expressly upheld such
treatment as recently as World War II.8 But the president chose to limit his
order to noncitizens.
TIMEs, Jan. 24, 2002, at A15.
3. Katharine Q. Seelye & Steven Erlanger, U.S. Suspends the Transport of Terror
Suspects to Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at AI; Katharine Q. Seelye, For America's
Captives, Home Is a Camp in Cuba, With Goggles and a Koran, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002,
at A14; Katherine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Captives; .On Defensive, General
Says Prisoners Get Mats, Even Bagels, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2002, at A16.
4. Seelye & Erlanger, supra note 3.
5. John Mintz, Debate Continues on Legal Status of Detainees, WASH. PosT, Jan. 28,
2002, at A15; Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Roundtable Briefing with Radio
Media (As Released by the Pentagon), FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 15, 2002 (quoting
Rumsfeld: "I do not feel even the slightest concern about their treatment. They are being
treated vastly better than they treated anybody else over the last several years and vastly
better than was their circumstance when they were found.").
6. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
7. News Conference Re: Criminal Charges Filed Againt John Walker Lindh, FED.
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 15, 2002.
8. In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), the Court upheld against a constitutional
challenge the use of a military tribunal to try a group of "German saboteurs" who had
secretly entered the United States posing as civilians with intent to attack U.S. installations.
One of those charged claimed that, having been born in the United States, he was a U.S.
citizen. The Court held that military tribunals can be used against citizens and aliens alike;
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That choice is emblematic of how we have responded to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. While there has been much talk about the need
to sacrifice liberty for a greater sense of security, in practice we have
selectively sacrificed noncitizens' liberties while retaining basic protections for
citizens. It is often said that civil liberties are the first casualty of war. It
would be more accurate to say that noncitizens' liberties are the first to go. The
current war on terrorism is no exception.
In the wake of September 11, we plainly need to rethink the balance
between liberty and security. The attacks, which killed more than 3,000 people
and did immeasurable damage to the human spirit, succeeded beyond our worst
nightmares and their perpetrators' wildest dreams in wreaking destruction and
spreading fear throughout the nation. We all feel a profound and deeply
unfamiliar sense of vulnerability in their wake and have a correspondingly
urgent need for security and reassurance. The anthrax scare that followed
underscored the gravity of the threats we face, vividly demonstrating that
scientific and technological advances have made instruments of mass
destruction far too widely accessible. And as Attorney General John
Ashcroft's statement quoted as an epigraph to this article illustrates, many
argue that the demands of waging war-here, a war without an articulable
endpoint-require that civil liberties not stand in the way of victory.9
There is undoubtedly a balance to be struck between liberty and security,
but there are also several reasons to be cautious about too readily sacrificing
liberty in the name of security. First, as a historical matter, we have often
overreacted in times of crisis. In World War I, we imprisoned people for years
at a time merely for speaking out against the war effort. 10 In World War II, we
interned more than 110,000 persons solely because of their Japanese ancestry.U
And during the Cold War, thousands of innocent persons lost their jobs, were
subjected to congressional investigations, or were incarcerated for their mere
association with the Communist Party. 12 In hindsight, these responses are
generally viewed as shameful excesses; but in their day, they were considered
reasonable and necessary.
Second, there is reason to think that as a general matter in times of crisis,
we will overestimate our security needs and discount the value of liberty.
Liberty is almost by definition abstract; it is measured by the absence of
the crucial predicate is not whether the individual is a citizen or an alien, but whether he is
an "unlawful combatant." !d. at 35-36.
9. See Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Policy, supra note 1.
10. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249

u.s. 47 (1919).

11. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 236 (1944).
12. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); MICHAL R. BELKNAP,
COLD WAR POLmCAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN
CMLLffiERTIES (1977); VICTORS. NAVASKY, NMv1INGNAMES (1983); ARTHURJ. SABIN, IN
CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND RED MONDAY (1999).
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control or restraint. Fear, by contrast, is immediate and palpable; it takes
physical form as stress, anxiety, depression, a pit in the stomach, a bad taste in
the mouth. It is easy to take liberty for granted, and to presume that
government powers to intrude on liberty are not likely to be directed at one's
own liberty. Fear affects us all, especially after an attack like that of September
11.
Third, liberty and security are not necessarily mutually exclusive values in
a zero-sum game. Liberty often plays a critical role in maintaining security.
One of the justifications for guaranteeing political freedoms is that a free
people are less likely to be driven to extreme violence. A political process that
treats people with equal dignity and allows dissidents to voice their views and
organize to change the rules through political means is likely to be more stable
in the long run. Recent experience in England and Israel has shown that
cracking down on civil liberties does not necessarily reduce violence, and may
simply inspire more violence. 13 As Justice Brandeis wrote, the Framers knew
"that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; [and] that hate
menaces stable government." 14
Understanding both the importance of liberty and the temptation to restrict
it that government authorities and democratic majorities would face in times of
crisis, the Framers sought to protect our basic liberties from the momentary
passions of the majority by inscribing them in the Constitution. But with few
exceptions, constitutional rights are not absolute; a balance must be struck. As
Justice Goldberg famously put it, "[the Constitution] is not a suicide pact." 15
Thus, while the tension between liberty and security should not be
overstated, it cannot be denied. We love liberty and security, but recognize that
sometimes we must limit one to enjoy the other. 16 When a democratic society
strikes that balance in ways that impose the costs and benefits uniformly on all,

13. Cf. T.R. Reid, Britons Know Price of Averting Terrorism at Home, WASH. POST,
Sept. 29, 2001 at A16 (maintaining that measures curtailing civil liberties in struggle against
the Irish Republican Army did not lead to further security and that only the agreement to
negotiate led to reduced violence). The Israelis have imposed guilt by association, collective
punishment, summary execution of suspected terrorists, and torture of detainees, yet it would
be difficult to claim that these measures have reduced terrorism. See U.S. STA1E DEP'T,
COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 2001: ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rlslhrrpt/2001/nea/8262.htm (Mar. 4, 2002);
Amnesty International, Israeli Military Action is Collective Punishment,
http://www.amnesty-usa.org/news/2002/israel04122002.htinl (Apr. 12, 2002).
14. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
15. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
16. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has written:
It is not simply "liberty" but civil liberty of which we speak. The word "civil," in tum is
derived from the Latin word civis, which means "citizen." A citizen is a person owing
allegiance to some organized government, and not a person in an idealized "state of nature"
free from any governmental restraint.

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 222 (1998)
(emphasis in original).
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one might be relatively confident that the political process will ultimately
achieve a proper balance. But all too often we seek to avoid the difficult tradeoffs by striking an illegitimate balance, sacrificing the liberties of a minority
group in order to further the majority's security interests. In the wake of
September 11, citizens and their elected representatives have repeatedly chosen
to sacrifice the liberties of noncitizens in furtherance of the citizenry's
purported security. Because noncitizens have no vote, and thus no direct voice
in the democratic process, they are a particularly vulnerable minority. And in
the heat of the nationalistic and nativist fervor engendered by war, noncitizens'
interests are even less likely to weigh in the balance.
In this essay, I will show how this double standard has operated, both in
the wake of September 11 and at critical moments in our history. Since
September 11, immigrants have been the targets of a massive preventive
detention campaign conducted under unprecedented secrecy. Congress has
enacted new laws that subject noncitizens to guilt by association, ideological
exclusion, and unilateral executive detention. And federal and local officials
have engaged in ethnic profiling, treating immigrants as suspect based on little
more than their Arab ethnicity or national origin.
Some argue that a "double standard" for citizens and noncitizens is
perfectly justified. The attacks of September 11 were perpetrated by 19 Arab
noncitizens, and we have reason to believe that other Arab noncitizens are
associated with the attackers and will seek to attack again. Citizens, it is said,
are presumptively loyal; noncitizens are not. Thus, it is not irrational to focus
on Arab noncitizens. Moreover, on a normative level, if citizens and
noncitizens were treated identically, citizenship itself might be rendered
meaningless. The very essence of war involves the drawing of lines in the sand
between citizens of our nation and those against whom we are fighting. Surely
in that setting it makes sense to treat noncitizens differently from citizens.
I will suggest that such reasoning should be resisted on three grounds: It is
normatively and constitutionally wrong; it undermines our security interests;
and it will pave the way for future inroads on citizens' liberties. First, properly
understood, the Constitution imposes substantial limits on sacrificing
immigrants' liberties for citizens' purported security. The basic rights at
stake-political freedom, due process, and equal protection of the laws-are
not limited to citizens, but apply to all "persons" subject to our laws. These
rights are best understood not as special privileges stemming from a specific
social contract, but from what it means to be a person with free and equal
dignity. They are human rights, not privileges of citizenship, and ought to
apply whenever we seek to impose legal obligations on persons. The
Constitution reserves relatively few rights to citizens, the principal one being
the right to vote. And precisely because noncitizens do not enjoy the franchise,
and therefore cannot rely on the political process for their protection, it is all
the more critical that they be accorded basic human rights enforceable in court.
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The fact that we are waging a "war on terrorism" does not alter these basic
constitutional principles. This war is more akin to the metaphorical (and
indefinite) "war on drugs" or "war on crime" than to a conventional war. As
yet, it fmds no nation on the other side. We are fighting an international
criminal organization, AI Qaeda, and those who aid it, including, thus far, the
Taliban. But we have declared war on no nation. Moreover, as the Japanese
internment of World War II illustrated, it is perilous to predicate suspicion on
ethnic identity even with respect to persons associated with a specific country
on which we have declared war. It is another matter entirely to apply such
treatment to citizens from a wide range of Arab countries, most of which are
fighting on our side in the war on terrorism.
Second, as a security matter, employing a double standard with respect to
the basic rights accorded citizens and noncitizens is likely to be
counterproductive at home and abroad, because it undermines our legitimacy in
both spheres. At home, law enforcement is more effective when it works with
rather than against communities. If authorities have reason to believe that there
might be potential terrorists lurking in the Arab immigrant community, they
would do better to work with the millions of law-abiding members of that
community to obtain their assistance in identifying potential threats, than to
alienate the community by treating many of its members as suspect because of
their ethnicity or national origin and pursuing others under conditions of
secrecy that invite fear and paranoia.
Legitimacy is essential at the international level as well. As September 11
illustrated, terrorism is a transnational phenomenon, and it demands a
transnational response. We must maintain a broad coalition if we are to
succeed in our efforts, not only because we need the cooperation of many
different nations' intelligence and law enforcement apparatuses, but also
because if we are seen as fighting for our own parochial interests and not for
the interests of justice and peace more broadly, we are likely to inspire more
people to take up the mantle of terrorism against us. As the critical responses
of our allies to the military tribunals and the Guantanamo detentions illustrate,
our credibility on matters of international law and human rights is already at a
low ebbY This is in large part our own fault; as the world's most powerful
nation, we have too often acted as if we are free to ignore international norms
whenever it serves our interests. 18 But doing so will surely undermine the
17. See David E. Sanger, A Nation Challenged: The Treatment; Prisoners Straddle an
Ideological Chasm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at A16; Katharine Q. Seelye & David E.
Sanger, Bush Reconsiders Stand on Treating Captives of War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at
Al; Katharine Q. Seelye, Criticized, U.S. Brings Visitors to Prison Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2002, at AS.
18. See generally Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and Lawyers'
Committee for Nuclear Policy, The Rule of Power or the Rule of Law?: An Assessment of
U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties (2002), available at
http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/fullrpt.pdf (criticizing U.S. pattern of rejecting or
disregarding international treaties); Anthony Lewis, Captives And the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
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multilateral coalition we desperately need to fight the war against terrorism
effectively. Secretary of State Colin Powell's reported objections to the United
States' stance on the Guantanamo prisoners reflects precisely that concern. 19
Finally, what we are willing to allow our government to do to immigrants
creates precedents for how it treats citizens. In 1798, for example, Congress
enacted the Enemy Alien Act, which remains on the books to this day and
authorizes the President during wartime to detain, deport, or otherwise restrict
the liberties of any citizen over 14 years of age of a country with which we are
at war, without any individualized showing of disloyalty, criminal conduct, or
even suspicion. In World War ll, the government extended that logic to intern
110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, about two-thirds of whom were U.S.
citizens. Similarly, while we think of the McCarthy era as beginning in the
1940s, it was in fact preceded by several decades of targeting immigrants for
their purportedly subversive political associations using immigration law. Joe
McCarthy simply applied to citizens techniques developed in the 1910s under
the leadership of a young J. Edgar Hoover, head of the Justice Department's
"Alien Radical" division. Measures initially targeted at noncitizens may well
come back to haunt us all.
In short, when we balance liberty and security, we should do so in ways
that respect the equal dignity and basic human rights of all persons and not
succumb to the temptation of purchasing security at the expense of noncitizens'
basic rights. In the wake of September 11, we have failed to follow that
mandate. But our long-term success in the campaign against terrorism
prompted by the September 11 attacks will turn on our treating immigrants as
we would want to be treated ourselves. In the end, the true test of justice in a
democratic society is not how it treats those with a political voice, but how it
treats those who have no voice in the democratic process.

ll. SACRIFICING THEIR LmERTY FOR OUR SECURITY: THE POST-9/11
REsPONSE
"'[S]omebody who comes into the United States of America illegally, who
conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent Americans-men,
women, and children-is not a lawful combatant .... They don't deserve the
same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen
26, 2002, at AIS (maintaining that "the prisoner issue touches a profound resentment abroad
at what many see as an American tendency to lecture others about international standards
while refusing to comply with those it urges"); The Guantanamo Story, WASH. POST, Jan.
25, 2002, at A24 (arguing that Administration response to criticism of treatment of detainees
at Guantanamo "suggested that the Bush administration would respect international law
only so far as it chose to").
19. Rowan Scarborough, Powell Wants Detainees to be Declared POWs; Memo Shows
Difference with White House, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at AI (reporting an internal
White House memorandum in which White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales noted
Powell's request that Taliban and AI Qaeda detainees be declared prisoners of war).
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going through the nonnal judicial process. "'20 With these words Vice President
Dick Cheney defended the president's military order of November 13, 2001,2 1
which authorizes trial by military commission of any noncitizen whom the
president accuses of engaging in international terrorism or belonging to AI
Qaeda. The vice president's view captures much of the administration's
response to the attacks of September 11. It has repeatedly targeted noncitizens,
selectively denying them liberties that citizens take for granted. Each of its
initiatives raises serious constitutional concerns, and each imposes burdens on
noncitizens' basic rights that citizens do not bear.
A. Secret Preventive Detention

Perhaps the most troubling feature of the government's response to the
attacks of September 11 has been its campaign of mass preventive detention.
The actual number detained is a mystery, because in early November 2001,
when the number was 1147, the government responded to growing criticism of
the number of persons it was detaining by halting its practice of issuing a
running tally. 22 If one assumes that the numbers of newly arrested persons
decreased by half in the five months since the government stopped announcing
a running tally, the number would be over 2,000 detained as of April2002. Yet
only a single person-Zaccarias Moussaoui-has been charged with any
involvement in the crimes under investigation. And he was arrested before
September 11. Government officials have claimed that 10 or 11 of the
detainees, presumably including Moussaoui, may be members of AI Qaeda.23
But that simply raises the question of why the other 1,990 or so individuals
were detained.
The detentions have been carried out under an unprecedented veil of
secrecy. Initially, the government refused to release any details regarding the
identity of the detainees. After substantial public pressure, a Freedom of
Infonnation Act (FOIA) lawsuit, and requests from members of Congress, the
Justice Department released limited infonnation in November regarding the
approximately 600 persons then still in federal custody. The vast majority of
the detainees were being held on immigration charges. About fifty were held
on federal criminal charges, and an undisclosed but assertedly small number
were held as material witnesses. The government refused to disclose how
many were being held on state or local charges, and refused to reveal the

20. Elisabeth Bumiller & Steven Lee Myers, Senior Administration Officials Defend
Military Tribunals for Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6.
21. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
22. Todd S. Purdum, A Nation Challenged: The Attorney General; Ashcroft's AboutFace on the Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at B7.
23. David Firestone & Christopher Drew, A Nation Challenged: The Cases; Al Queda
Link Seen in Only a Handful of 1,200 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at Al.
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identities of any of the immigration or material witness detainees. 24 In
February 2002, the government announced that 327 persons remained in INS
custody in connection with the September 11 investigation, but continued to
refuse to provide the identities or charges for any of these persons.25 This
secrecy makes it difficult to assess the extent to which the government is
adhering to or violating the law in its detention policy.
The Justice Department has been especially secretive about the largest
group of detainees, those held on immigration charges. As of December 2001,
it had detained approximately 725 persons on immigration charges in
connection with the September 11 investigation.26 All immigration detainees
have been tried in proceedings closed to the public, the press, legal observers,
and even family members. On orders from Attorney General Ashcroft, Chief
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy has instructed immigration judges not to
list the cases on the public docket, and to refuse to co~ or deny that they
even exist.27 All hearings must be closed, no matter how routine, and whether
or not any sensitive issues are discussed. Yet the INS has not used classified
information in the proceedings, nor has it imposed protective orders on the
aliens or their attorneys that would bar them from relaying to the public
everything that they can recall happening in the hearing. 28 Thus, the
government cannot justify the closure order as a means of maintaining the
confidentiality of classified information. Such an unprecedented and broadbased use of secret proceedings raises fundamental questions of fairness,
because public scrutiny is critical to a fair process.29 A federal judge ruled in

24. Neil A. Lewis & Don Van Natta, Jr., A Nation Challenged: The Investigation;
Ashcroft Offers Accounting of64J Charged or Held, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 2001, at Al.
25. Amnesty International, Amnesty International's Concerns Regarding Post
September 11 Detentions in the USA, (March 14, 2002), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/usacrisis/9.ll.detentions2.rtf; Christopher Drew & Judith Miller, A Nation
Challenged: The Detainees; Though Not Linked to Terrorism, Many Detainees Cannot Go
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,2002, at Al.
26. Dan Eggen, Delays Cited in Charging Detainees; With Legal Latitude, INS
Sometimes Took Weeks, WASH. PosT, Jan. 15, 2002, at Al.
27. Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy to All Immigration
Judges re: Cases Requiring Special Procedures (Sept. 21, 2001). See also Detroit Free Press
v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5839 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2002) (declaring this closure
order unconstitutional as applied to close a particular immigration proceeding); William
Glaberson, A Nation Challenged: Secret Trials; Closed Immigration Hearings Criticized as
Prejudicial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B7.
28. William Glaberson, U.S. Asks to Use Secret Evidence in Many Cases Of
Deportation, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2001, at lB (reporting that government has not used
classified information against immigrants under Bush administration); Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (noting that INS had imposed no
protective orders on immigrants or their attorneys regarding closed immigration hearings).
29. See Globe Newpaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (finding that
"[p]ublic scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the
factfinding process"); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979) ("Openness in
court proceedings may improve the quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to come
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April 2002 that the closure order violates the First Amendment rights of the
public and press to observe the trials. 30 Yet over 700 aliens have been tried in
secret.
Many of those detained on immigration charges were initially held for
weeks or even months without any charges.31 On September 20, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) amended a regulation governing
detention without charges.32 The preexisting regulation had required the INS to
file charges within 24 hours of detaining an alien. 33 Under the new regulation,
detention without charges is permissible in all cases for 48 hours, and for an
unspecified "reasonable" period beyond that in times of emergency.34
Documents disclosed in the FOIA lawsuit show that 317 detainees were held
for more than 48 hours before being charged, 36 detainees were held for more
than four weeks without charges, and nine were held for more than 50 days
without charges.3s
With the exception of Zaccarias Moussaoui and perhaps the material
witnesses, all of the detainees are being held on "pretextual" charges. The real
reason for their incarceration is not that they worked without authorization or
took too few academic credits, for example. Rather, the government has used
these excuses to detain them because it thinks they might have valuable

forward with relevant testimony, [and] cause all trial participants to perform their duties
more conscientiously ....").
30. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5839 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(ruling that closed immigration hearings in wake of September 11 violated First Amendment
and issuing injunction requiring public access). See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (ruling that the First Amendment guarantees public right of
access to criminal trials); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
(same); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983)
(deciding that the First Amendment protects right of access to open civil trial), cert. denied,
465 u.s. 1100 (1984).
The closure order also violates aliens' due process rights to an open proceeding. See
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (holding that due process requires open hearings
in administrative proceedings regarding commission rates charged at stockyards); Fitzgerald
v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that due process requires open hearings
for civil servants' termination hearings). I am co-counsel for Rabih Haddad in a case
presenting that claim in relation to the immigration case at issue in the Detroit Free Press
case decided above. Haddad v. Ashcroft, No. 02-70605 (E.D. Mich.). See Detroit Free
Press v. Ashcroft, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5838 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (ruling that court has
jurisdiction to entertain alien's due process challenge). I am also co-counsel for the North
Jersey Media Group in a case raising a similar First Amendment access claim. See North
Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, No.2: 2002 CV 00967 (D.N.J. 2002).
31. See Amnesty International, supra note 25; Eggen, supra note 26; Dan Eggen, Long
Wait for Filing Charges Common for Sept. II Detainees; Delays Reasonable, INS Officials
Say, WASH.POST,Jan. 19,2002,atA12.
32. 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001) (amending 8 C.F.R. 287.3(d)).
33. 8 C.F.R. 287.3(d) (2000).
34. 8 C.P.R. 287.3(d) (2002).
35. Amnesty International, supra note 25, at 10-11.
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information, because it suspects them but lacks sufficient evidence to make a
charge, or simply because the FBI is not yet convinced that they are innocent.
Consider, for example, Ali Maqtari. A Yemeni citizen, Maqtari was picked
up on September 15 when he accompanied his U.S. citizen wife to Fort
Campbell, Kentucky, where she was reporting for Army basic training. Agents
interrogated him for more than 12 hours and accused him of being involved
with terrorists. Maqtari took and passed a lie detector test, but was detained on
the highly technical charge that he had been in the country illegally for ten days
while changing his status from tourist to permanent resident. The government
never offered any evidence linking him to terrorism or crime of any kind. It
merely submitted a boilerplate affidavit from an FBI agent arguing that Maqtari
should be detained because the investigation of terrorism is a "mosaic," and
therefore, seemingly innocent facts might at some future time turn out to
indicate culpability. Two months later, Maqtari was released without charges.36
Another man, Osama Elfar, was detained on September 24, 2001,
apparently because he was Egyptian, attended a Florida flight school, and
worked as a mechanic for a small airline in St. Louis. He agreed to leave the
country, but a month later, he was still detained. 37 Hady Hassan Omar, also an
Egyptian, spent two months in jail because he made plane reservations on a
Kinko's computer around the same time that one of the hijackers did so. He
was released without charges on November 23, 2001.38
These and other cases suggest that the Justice Department policy has been
to lock up flrst, ask questions later, and presume that an alien is dangerous until
the FBI has a chance to assure itself that the individual is not. The government
has justified its actions with a liberal combination of the "mosaic" argument
noted above and the "sleeper" theory. Under the latter, the fact that a
suspicious person has done nothing illegal only underscores his dangerousness;
Al Qaeda is said to have "sleeper" cells around the world, groups of individuals
living quiet and law-abiding lives, but ready and willing to commit terrorist
attacks once they get the call.39 Taken together, the "mosaic" and "sleeper"
theories suggest that the absence of evidence of illegal conduct is not a reason
to release a "suspicious" person. In practice, they appear to have justified
tremendously overbroad detention policies.

36. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing of Department of Justice Oversight, 106th
Cong. (Dec. 4, 2001) (statement of Ali al-Maqtari); David Firestone, A Nation Challenged:
The Detainees; Ali al-Maqtari, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 2001, at B5.
37. Jodi Wilgoren, A Nation Challenged: The Detainees; Swept Up in a Dragnet,
Hundreds Sit in Custody and Ask, 'Why?', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at B5. Elfar later
went on a hunger strike to protest his detention, consuming only water for seven days. At
least fourteen detainees have done the same. Peter Slevin & George Lardner, Jr., Some
Detainees Tum to Hunger Strikes, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2001, at A20.
38. Wilgoren, supra note 37.
39. Karen DeYoung, 'Sleeper Cells' of Al Qaeda are Next Target; U.S. to Focus on
Te"or Threat as Afghan Effort Winds Down, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2001, at AI.
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Government documents disclosed in the FOIA lawsuit in December
showed that of the 725 people held on immigration charges, over 350 had
already been determined to be of no interest to the investigation.40 The number
of such "cleared" individuals is no doubt much higher today, since, as noted
above, only one person has been charged with involvement in the September
11 attacks. Yet until the FBI clears an individual, he is detained, even when the
government has no legitimate legal basis for detention. Ibrahim Turkmen, a
citizen of Turkey, was arrested and detained on October 13, 2001, and given
voluntary departure on October 31. Two days later, a friend purchased a ticket
for him and brought it to the INS office. Yet the INS kept Turkmen in custody
for nearly four more months, until the FBI convinced itself that he was
innocent.41 The New York Times reported that as of February 18, 2002, the
Justice Department was blocking the departures of 87 foreign citizens who had
either agreed to leave or had been ordered deported.42 The government was
continuing to hold them simply because it had not yet satisfied itself that they
were innocent, even though there was no longer any ostensible immigration
purpose for their detention, they were charged with no crimes, and they had
been afforded no probable cause hearings.
The INS has no legal authority to detain a person once it can remove him
from the country. It may put him on an airplane at that point, but it cannot
decline to remove and simply hold him in custody. The INS's authority to
detain is only incident to its authority to deport. Where detention is necessary
to effectuate deportation, the Supreme Court has permitted the INS to employ a
But it cannot impose detention for
form of preventive detention.43
punishment,44 nor does it have any freestanding authority to detain persons who
might be thought to be dangerous.45 Yet the INS appears to be doing just that
with respect to many of the immigration detainees, who are held on pretextual
immigration charges and the faintest of suspicions and are being held in many
instances even when the immigration charges have been fmally resolved, and
the aliens are willing to leave the country.46
Some argue that because the detainees have at least allegedly violated
immigration laws, they deserve to be detained. But while an allegation of an
immigration violation, if proven, may justify deportation (if the alien does not
40. Eggen, supra note 26.
41. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft, CV-02-307 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Susan Sachs, A Nation
Challenged: Detainees; Civil Rights Group to Sue Over U.S. Handling of Muslim Men, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at All. I am co-counsel in the Turkmen case.
42. Drew & Miller, supra note 25.
43. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
44. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
45. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001), for example, the
Supreme Court held that even aliens who had been finally ordered deported and who were
found to be dangerous could not be detained indefinitely if they were not likely to be
deported in the foreseeable future.
46. Drew & Miller, supra note 25; Eggen, supra note 26; Eggen, supra note 31.
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qualify for some form of relief permitting him to remain, such as political
asylum), the allegation of a violation does not in itself justify detention.
Detention is the exception, for immigration law has long held that aliens placed
in removal proceedings and alleged to have violated the terms of their visas
may not be detained while the administrative process determines their fate
unless they pose a danger to the community or a flight risk.47 Under a new
regulation issued October 29, 2001, however, even if an immigration judge
rules after a custody hearing that the government has shown no basis for
detention, an INS district director-in effect, the prosecutor--can keep the
alien locked up simply by filing an appeal of the release order.48 Appeals of
immigration custody decisions routinely take months and often more than a
year to decide. And the INS need not make any showing that its appeal is
likely to succeed.
None of these measures apply to citizens. Citizens are entitled to a public
trial. They may be subjected to "preventive detention," but only if brought
before an independent judge within 48 hours of arrest for a hearing to
determine whether there is probable cause that they have committed a crime,
and only if they are shown to be a flight risk or danger to the community.49
The "speedy trial" requirement means that unless a citizen agrees to an
extension, preventive detention is limited to a matter of weeks. 5° Citizens
cannot be held simply because the government entertains vague suspicions
about them and has not yet convinced itself that they are innocent. And if a
judge rules that a citizen should be released on bail pending trial, the prosecutor
cannot keep him in jail simply by filing an appeal. In other words, we have
imposed on foreign citizens widespread human rights deprivations that we
would not likely tolerate if imposed on ourselves.

47. O'Rourke v. Warden, 539 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The BIA ... has
construed [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)] to provide that the determination to release an alien pending
deportation proceedings is 'not a discretionary form of relief but rather 'an alien should be
detained or required to post a bond, only if he is a threat to national security or is a poor bail
risk."') (quoting In re O'Rourke, A22 607 396, Decision and Order of the BIA, August 13,
1980, at 3); see also In re Drysdale, 20 I. & N. Dec. 815, 817 (BIA 1994) ("Once it is
determined that an alien does not present a danger to the community or any bail risk, then no
bond should be required."); In re De La Cruz, 20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 349 (BIA 1991) (same);
Matter of Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (BIA 1976) (same).
48. Review of Custody Determinations, Interim Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,909 (Oct. 31,
2001) (to be codified at 8 C.P.R. pt. 3).
49. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment presumptively requires probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest);
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding pre-trial preventive detention of
criminal defendants who pose a danger or a flight risk under Bail Reform Act).
50. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3161(b) (2002) (requiring that charges be filed within thirty days of
an arrest); 18 U.S.C.S. § 3161(c)(l) (2002) (requiring that trial must commence within
seventy days of filing charges).
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B. The USA PATRIOT Act
The targeting of noncitizens is further reflected in the USA PATRIOT
Act,5 1 an omnibus antiterrorism bill enacted just six weeks after September 11.
The Act makes many changes to criminal, immigration, banking, and
intelligence law, but it reserves its most extreme measures for noncitizens. It
makes noncitizens deportable for wholly innocent associational activity,
excludable for pure speech, and detainable on the Attorney General's say-so,
without a hearing and without a fmding that they pose a danger or a flight risk.

1. Guilt by association.
Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act imposes guilt by association on
aliens. This McCarthy-era philosophy, which the Supreme Court has since
condenmed as "alien to the traditions of a free society and the First
Amendment itself,"52 has made a strong comeback in recent years under the
guise of cutting off funding for terrorism.53 Before September 11, however,
aliens were deportable for engaging in or supporting terrorist activity, but not
for mere association. 54 Aliens could be deported for providing material support
to an organization only if they knew or reasonably should have known that
their activity would support the organization "in conducting a terrorist
activity."55 In other words, the government had to demonstrate a nexus
between the alien's conduct and terrorist activity. The USA PATRIOT Act
eliminates that nexus requirement. It makes aliens deportable for wholly
innocent associational activity with a "terrorist organization," whether or not
there is any connection between the alien's associational conduct and any act of
violence, much less terrorism. 56 Because the new law defines "terrorist
activity" to include virtually any use or threat to use a weapon, and defines
"terrorist organization" as any group of two or more persons that has used or
threatened to use a weapon, the Act's proscription on associational activity
51. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
52. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982) (citations omitted).
53. See generally David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists,
and the Right ofAssociation, 1999 SUP. CT. REv. 203 (1999).
54. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2000); /d. at§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
55. Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § II82(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).
56. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 51, at§ 411. The Act defines as a deportable
offense the solicitation of members or funds for, or the provision of material support to, any
group designated as terrorist. There is no defense available, not even for those who can
show that their support had no connection to furthering terrorism. The government is free to
designate any organization that uses or threatens to use violence as terrorist. In addition, the
law makes aliens who support even nondesignated groups deportable if the group has
engaged in or threatened violence, unless the alien can prove that he neither knew nor
reasonably should have known that his support would further the group's terrorist activities.
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potentially encompasses every organization that has ever been involved in a
civil war or a crime of violence, from a pro-life group that once threatened
workers at an abortion clinic, to the African National Congress, the Irish
Republican Army, or the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.
Under this law, an alien who sent a toy train set to a day-care center run by
a designated organization would be deportable as a terrorist, even if she could
show that the train set was used only by three-year olds. Indeed, the law
extends even to those who seek to support a group for the purpose of
countering terrorism. Thus, an alien who offered to train IRA representatives in
negotiating in the hope of furthering the peace process in Great Britain and
forestalling further violence could be deported as a terrorist if the Secretary of
State chose to designate the IRA as a proscribed group.
Had this law been on the books in the 1980s, the thousands of noncitizens
who supported the African National Congress's lawful, nonviolent antiapartheid activity would have been deportable as terrorists. The ANC used
military as well as nonviolent means in its struggle against apartheid, and the
State Department routinely designated it as a terrorist organization before it
came to power in the 1990s.57
Some argue that the threat from terrorist organizations abroad and the
fungibility of money require adjustments to the constitutional prohibition on
guilt by association. But that prohibition was developed in the crucible of a
battle against an even more formidable foe-the Communist Party, an
organization that Congress found to be, and the Supreme Court accepted as, a
foreign-dominated organization that used sabotage and terrorism for the
purpose of overthrowing the United States by force and violence.58 If
association with such an organization deserves protection, surely association
with much less powerful groups that have merely used or threatened to use a
weapon at some point deserves similar protection.
In addition, the fungibility argument rests on a faulty factual assumption.
It maintains that because money is fungible, even a donation of blankets to a
hospital will free up resources that will then be devoted to terrorism. But this
argument assumes that a group engaged in a political struggle that uses both
legal and illegal means will necessarily devote every marginal dollar to its
illegal means. On this assumption, every dollar donated to the ANC for its
nonviolent opposition to apartheid freed up a dollar that the ANC then spent on
violent, terrorist ends. While some groups (including AI Qaeda) may be so
committed to violence that all other activities are merely a front for terrorism,
that is not likely to be true for most political organizations that use violence.

57. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATIERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISl\1: 1988, at 82
(1989); U.S. DEP'TOFSTATE, PATIERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1987, at 65 (1988).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967); Scales v. United States, 367
u.s. 203, 221-22 (1961).
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For most groups, violence is but one means to a political end. This is not to
excuse the violence, but to insist that one can often meaningfully distinguish
between a group's lawful and unlawful activities.
Consider Hamas, for example, which the government has designated as a
terrorist group, and which has itself proclaimed responsibility for numerous
suicide bombings. In 1996, the Israeli government estimated that Hamas
devoted 95 percent of its resources to legal social service activity and only 5
percent to violent or military activity. 59 In 1994 the State Department opposed
making membership in Hamas a ground for denying visas, arguing that because
Hamas engaged in "widespread social welfare programs" as well as terrorism,
one could not presume that a Hamas member was a "terrorist" without
indulging in guilt by association. 60 There is no evidence that the social welfare
programs to which Hamas devotes 95 percent of its resources are merely a
cover for its terrorist activities. Indeed, if Hamas sought to devote every
marginal dollar to terror, one would expect to see its relative distribution of
resources between illegal and legal activities reversed. Is it really plausible that
every blanket provided to a Hamas-run hospital will lead to more money being
spent on terrorist attacks? If it could be shown that a group's "legitimate"
activities were a cover for its illegal activities, action against its legitimate
enterprises would be justified, just as federal law allows the government to
seize legitimate businesses from organized crime groups where it can show that
they are fronts for criminal activity. 61 But short of such a showing, we can and
should distinguish between lawful and unlawful activities. We could not
criminalize everyone who buys a pizza at a Mafia-run restaurant or gives a gift
at a Mafia don's wedding; nor should we treat as terrorist the provision of ·
humanitarian aid to disfavored "terrorist organizations."
The fungibility argument also proves too much as a legal matter. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down or narrowly construed laws that
penalized association with the Communist Party absent proof that the
individual specifically intended to further the group's illegal ends. 62 It has also
59. Serge Schmemann, Cradle to Grave; Terror Isn't Alone as a Threat to Mideast
Peace, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1996, at Dl.
60. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 7 (Feb. 23, 1994) (written testimony of Mary A.
Ryan, Assistant Sec'y for Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State); see also id. at 9 (written
testimony of Chris Sale, Deputy Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service).
61. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-68 (2001); Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1956-57 (2002)
(forfeiture of property is authorized by 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 981-82 (2002)).
62. See Robel, 389 U.S. at 262 (invalidating ban on Communist Party members
working in defense facilities absent showing of"specific intent''); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 606
(holding that "[m]ere knowing membership without a specific intent to further the unlawful
aims of an organization is not a constitutionally adequate basis" for barring Communist
Party members from employment in state university system); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S.
11, 19 (1966) (invalidating oath requiring state employees not to join Communist Party
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repeatedly recognized that the rights of speech and association would mean
little without the right to raise and spend money to speak and associate, and
accordingly, has protected fundraising and donations as acts of association and
speech.63 An association cannot exist without the material support of its
members. If the provision of material support to a group were somehow
constitutionally different from membership, then all of the anti-Communist
measures declared invalid by the Supreme Court could have simply been
rewritten to make punishment contingent on the payment of dues, the
volunteering of time, or any of the other material manifestations of political
association. The right of association, in other words, would be left a
meaningless formality.
2. Ideological exclusion.

The USA PATRIOT Act also resurrects ideological exclusion, the practice
of denying entry to aliens for pure speech. It bars admission to aliens who
"endorse or espouse terrorist activity," or who "persuade others to support
terrorist activity or a terrorist organization," in ways determined by the
Secretary of State to undermine U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. 64 It also
excludes aliens who are representatives of groups that "endorse acts of terrorist
activity" in ways that similarly undermine U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.
Because of the breadth of the definitions of "terrorist activity" and "terrorist
organizations," this authority would empower the government to deny entry to
because "[a] law which applies to membership without the 'specific intent' to further the
illegal aims of the organization infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms"); Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961) (finding that the First Amendment bars
punishment of "one in sympathy with the ligitimate [sic] aims of [the Communist Party], but
not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence"); Scales, 367 U.S. at
221-22 (construing Smith Act, which barred membership in organization advocating violent
overthrow of government, to require showing of "specific intent").
63. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (holding that statutory prohibition against
paid solicitors violates First Amendment); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626-27
(1984) (finding that the First Amendment protects nonprofit group's right to solicit funds);
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1981) (holding
that monetary contributions to a group are a form of "collective expression" protected by the
right of association); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S.
620, 632-38 (1980) (ruling that the First Amendment protects nonprofit group's right to
solicit funds); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17, 24-25 (1976) (holding that the First
Amendment protects monetary contributions to political campaigns); Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321-25 (1958) (striking down on First Amendment grounds law
requiring permit to solicit citizens for membership in any organization that requires fees or
dues); In re Asbestos School Litig., 46 F.3d 1284, 1290 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that
contributions to political organization are constitutionally protected absent specific intent to
further the group's illegal ends); Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practice
Comm'n, 955 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that "contributing money is an act of
political association that is protected by the First Amendment"), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1230
(1992).
64. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 51 at§ 411.
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any alien who advocated support for the ANC, for the Contras during the war
against the Sandinistas, or for opposition forces in Iraq and Iran today.
Because all of these groups have used force or violence, they would be terrorist
organizations, and anyone who urged people to support them could be denied
entry on the Secretary of State's say-so.
Citizens have a constitutional right to endorse terrorist organizations or
terrorist activity, so long as their speech is not intended and likely to produce
imminent lawless action. 65 While the Supreme Court has long ruled that aliens
outside our borders-in contrast to those living among us-have limited
constitutional rights, 66 such ideological exclusions nonetheless raise
constitutional concerns.67 The First Amendment is designed to protect a robust
public debate, and if our government can keep out persons who espouse
disfavored ideas, our opportunity to hear and consider those ideas will be
diminished. More broadly, excluding people for their ideas is contrary to the
spirit of political freedom for which the United States stands. It was for that
reason that Congress removed all such grounds from the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) in 1990, after years of embarrassing visa denials for
political reasons. 68 We are a strong enough country, and our resolve against
terrorism is strong enough, to make such censorship unnecessary. Yet we have
now returned to the much-criticized ways of the McCarran-Walter Act,
targeting aliens not for their acts but for their words, and for words that would
be fully protected if uttered by United States citizens.
3.

Unilateral executive detention.

The USA PATRIOT Act radically revises the rules governing detention of
immigrants. Prior to its enactment, aliens in removal proceedings were subject
to preventive detention under essentially the same standards that apply to
defendants in criminal proceedings: They could be detained without bond if
they posed a danger to the community or a risk of flight. 69 Unless the
65. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447(1969).
66. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (assuming without deciding
that alien outside the United States does not have First Amendment right to object to his
exclusion); United States ex rei. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (holding that
aliens outside the United States do not have a right to enter protected by the Constitution).
67. See, e.g., Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 775 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing that
exclusion of alien for his political associations and views infringes on the rights of U.S.
citizens to exchange ideas with him); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(same), aff'd per curiam, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions:
Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930 (1987).
68. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C) (repealing
INA § 212(a)(27) and (28) (1952), which excluded anarchists; members of the Communist
party; aliens who advocated Communism or violent overthrow of the U.S. government; and
aliens who wrote or published, or even knowingly had in their possession, material
advocating such activities).
69. See note 47 supra.
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government could make such a showing in a hearing before an immigration
judge, aliens were entitled to release on bond.
The USA PATRIOT Act gives the Attorney General unprecedented power
to detain aliens without a hearing and without a showing that they pose a threat
to national security or a flight risk. He need only certify that he has
"reasonable grounds to believe" that the alien is "described in" various antiterrorism provisions of the INA, and the alien is then subject to potentially
indefinite "mandatory detention."70 The INA's anti-terrorism provisions in tum
include persons who are mere members of designated "terrorist
organizations,''7 1 and persons who have supported the lawful activities of such
organizations.72 Because the INA defines "engage in terrorist activity" so
broadly as to include the use of, or threat to use, a weapon with ~ntent to
endanger person or property,73 it would encompass a permanent resident alien
who brandished a kitchen knife in a domestic dispute with her abusive
husband, or an alien who found himself in a barroom brawl, picked up a bottle,
and threatened another person with it. Surely all such persons do not pose a
danger or flight risk necessitating mandatory preventive detention, yet the USA
PATRIOT Act empowers the Attorney General to detain such persons without
any showing that they pose a danger or flight risk.
The mandatory detention provision applies both during removal
proceedings, which frequently last years, and after removal proceedings have
concluded, even where the proceeding determines that the alien may not be
removed. The Supreme Court has held that "[i]n our society liberty is the
norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.''74 Preventive detention is constitutional only in very limited
circumstances, where there is a demonstrated need for the detention-because
of current dangerousness or risk of flight-and only where adequate procedural
safeguards ensure a prompt and fair adjudication of whether detention is
necessary.75 Where there is no showing that the alien poses a threat to the

70. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 51 at§ 412(a)(3) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)
(2001)).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V) (2001).
72. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV), (VI)
(2001).
73. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) (Law. Co-op. 2002).
74. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
75. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2498-99 (2001) (explaining
constitutional limits on preventive detention, and interpreting immigration statute not to
permit indefinite detention of deportable aliens); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80-81
(1992) (holding civil commitment to be constitutional only where individual is mentally ill
and poses a danger to the community and adequate procedural protections are provided);
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751-55 (upholding preventive detention only where there is a showing
of threat to others or risk of flight, the detention is limited in time, and adequate procedural
safeguards are provided).
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community or a risk of flight, there is no justification for detention, and any
such detention would violate substantive due process.
In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act appears to permit detention of aliens
indefinitely, even where they have prevailed in their removal proceedings. It
provides that detention shall be maintained "irrespective of ... any relief from
removal granted the alien, until the Attorney General determines that the alien
is no longer an alien who may be certified."76 But an alien who has been
granted relief from removal may not be removed. An alien granted asylum, for
example, has a legal right to live in the United States. At that point, the INS
has no legitimate basis for detaining the individual. As noted above, the INS's
authority to detain is only incidental to its removal authority.77 If the INS
cannot remove an individual, it has no basis for detaining him.78
The standard for certification raises additional constitutional concerns.
The Act authorizes mandatory and potentially indefinite detention whenever
the Attorney General has "reasonable grounds to believe" that an alien falls
within one of the specified grounds of deportation or inadmissability. If that is
interpreted as requiring anything less than probable cause, the constitutional
minimum required for an arrest, it would likely be unconstitutional. Moreover,
even probable cause is not constitutionally sufficient to justify preventive
pretrial detention absent a separate and additional fmding that the individual
poses either a risk of flight or a threat to the community.79
4.

Secret searches without probable cause.

The USA PATRIOT Act also made substantial changes to the rules that
govern the collection and sharing of information by law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. Many of these changes potentially affect citizens and
immigrants alike, although their principal targets, at least initially, are likely to
be Arab and Muslim immigrants. One of the most significant changes has the
effect of authorizing warrants for secret searches (so-called "black bag jobs")
and wiretaps in criminal investigations without probable cause of criminal

76. 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)(2) (2001), amended by USA PATRIOT Act§ 412.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
78. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2505 (holding that INS could not detain indefinitely even

aliens finally detennined to be deportable where there was no reasonable likelihood that they
could be deported because no country would take them). The Court in Zadvydas reserved for
another day the legality of indefinite detention of deportable aliens where applied "narrowly
to 'a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals,' say suspected terrorists." 121 S.
Ct. at 2499 (citation omitted). But the USA PATRIOT Act's definition of "terrorist activity"
is not limited to a narrow, "small segment of particularly dangerous individuals," as the
Court in Zadvydas contemplated, but applies to garden-variety criminals, barroom brawlers,
and those who have supported no violent activity whatsoever, but have merely provided
humanitarian support to a disfavored group.
79. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751-52.
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conduct.80 The Fourth Amendment generally permits the government to
conduct searches or wiretaps only where it has probable cause that an
individual is engaged in criminal activity or that evidence of a crime would be
found. But the USA PATRIOT Act allows the government to evade that
requirement wherever it says that its investigation also has a significant foreign
intelligence purpose.
It accomplishes this by amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA). 81 FISA creates a limited exception to the criminal probable cause rule
for foreign intelligence gathering. It authorizes the FBI to conduct electronic
surveillance and secret physical searches without a criminal predicate, on the
theory that foreign intelligence gathering is not designed to detect crimes but to
gather information about foreign agents. Accordingly, it authorizes warrants
not on a showing of probable criminal conduct, but on a showing that the target
of the intrusion is an "agent of a foreign power." "Agent" is defmed broadly to
include any officer or employee of a foreign based political organization, so
that an employee of or volunteer for Amnesty International could be an
"agent."82 If the suspected agent of a foreign power is a U.S. citizen or
permanent resident alien, the government is not allowed to base its warrant on
activities protected by the First Amendment, but there is no requirement that
the warrant be predicated on criminal activity.83
Searches and wiretaps under FISA may be kept secret from the target, in
many cases forever. Targets of criminal searches and wiretaps, by contrast,
must be notified eventually of the search. Under FISA, a person is notified of
surveillance only if he or she is later prosecuted using the evidence seized.
Even then, defendants have little opportunity to challenge the validity of the
search, for they are not provided the affidavit that served as the basis for the
surveillance.84 Where individuals are not prosecuted, notice is never provided,
and therefore the search cannot be challenged unless the target somehow
independently discovers it.
The extraordinary authority provided by FISA was justified on the ground
that foreign intelligence gathering is different from criminal law enforcement,
and that the intelligence authority would not be used for the purpose of
investigating crime. At the same time, Congress recognized that evidence of
crimes might be obtained during legitimate foreign intelligence gathering-

80. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 51, at § 218 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§
1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B) (2001)).
81. 50 u.s.c. §§ 1801-1863 (2001).
82. 50 U.S.C.S. § 180l(a)(5) (Law. Co-op. 2002) (defining "foreign power" to include
"a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States
persons"); 50 U.S.C.S. 180l(b)(l)(A) (2002) (defining an "Agent of a foreign power'' to
include "any person other than a United States person, who ... acts in the United States as
an officer or employee of a foreign power'').
83. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (Law. Co-op. 2002).
84. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1825 (g) (Law. Co-op. 2002).
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espionage, for example, is a crime-and therefore allowed the use of FISA
evidence in criminal cases. But in order to obtain a FISA warrant, the "primary
purpose" of the investigation had to be the collection of foreign intelligence,
not criminal law enforcement. Otherwise, the statute would serve as an endrun around the probable cause requirements of the criminal wiretap statute.
In the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress eliminated the primary purpose test,
amending FISA to allow wiretaps and physical searches without probable cause
in criminal investigations so long as "a significant purpose" of the intrusion is
to collect foreign intelligence, a showing that should be easy to make whenever
the government's target is a politically active foreign citizen.85 The express
justification for this amendment was to permit the government to initiate
wiretaps under FISA's lower standard where the investigation's primary
purpose was to collect criminal evidence. The potential scope of this loophole
is enormous, for it permits searches in criminal investigations without probable
cause of a crime.
C. Ethnic Profiling

One of the most dramatic responses to the attack of September 11 was a
swift reversal in public attitudes about racial and ethnic profiling as a law
enforcement tool. Before September 11, about 80 percent of the American
public considered racial profiling wrong. 86 State legislatures, local police
departments, and the President had condemned the practice and ordered data
collection on the racial patterns of stops and searches.87 The U.S. Customs
Service, sued for racial profiling, had instituted measures to counter racial and
ethnic profiling at the borders. A federal law on racial profiling seemed likely.
After September 11, however, polls reported that nearly 60 percent ·of the
American public favored ethnic profiling, at least as long as it was directed at
Arabs and Muslims.88 The fact that the perpetrators of the September 11 attack
were all male Arab immigrants and that the attack was apparently orchestrated
by AI Qaeda has led many to believe that it is only common sense to pay closer
attention to Arab-looking men boarding airplanes and elsewhere. The high
stakes make the case for engaging in profiling stronger here than in routine
85. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 51, at § 218 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§
1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B) (2001)).
86. Gallup Poll, Do You Approve or Disapprove of the Use of 'Racial Profiling' by
Police? (Dec. 9, 1999), available at WESTLAW, USGALLUP.120999 R6 009.
87. See generally DAVID HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING
CANNOT WORK (2002).
88. Sam Howe Verhovek, A Nation Challenged: Civil Liberties; Americans Give in to
Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at Al. A Detroit News poll of Michigan
residents found that while "70 percent generally opposed racial profiling, 70 percent also
agreed that 'authorities should take extra precautions in screening people of Arab descent
when flying."' Gregg Krupa, Most in State Support Screening of Arabs, DETROIT NEWS,
Feb. 28, 2002, at Al.
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drug interdiction stops on highways. Thus, Stuart Taylor, a columnist for
Newsweek, the National Journal, and Legal Times, who had previously been
highly critical of racial profiling, wrote shortly after the attacks in favor of
ethnic profiling of Arab men on airplanes.89 Press accounts made clear that,
whether as a matter of official policy or not, law enforcement officials were
paying closer attention to those who appear to be Arabs and Muslims.90
While the Bush Administration has been careful to speak out against ethnic
and religious intolerance.and hate crimes, it has sent mixed messages through
its own enforcement policies. In November, the Justice Department announced
its intention to interview 5,000 young immigrant men, based solely on their
age, date of arrival, and the country from which they came.91 The countries
singled out were said to be those where support for AI Qaeda was believed to
exist, mostly Arab nations. In any event it appeared that virtually all of those
interviewed were Arabs or Muslims. Several police departments around the
country refused to participate in the interviews on the grounds that the practice
appeared to constitute ethnic profiling.92
In January 2002, the Washington Post reported that the Justice Department
had decided to prioritize the deportation of 6,000 aliens, selected from more
than 300,000 foreign nationals who have remained in the country after being
ordered deported.93 The basis for their selection? Once again, nothing more
than that they are young men from countries where AI Qaeda support is
thought to exist, i.e., Arab countries.
There is no question that the immediate aftermath of September 11 called
for greater urgency than the ongoing war on drugs. But that does not
89. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Case for Using Racial Profiling at Airports, 33 NAT'L J. 38,
(2001). Before September 11, Taylor wrote that:
[R]acial profiling by police should be held to be unconstitutional ... even where there is a
statistically valid basis for believing that it will help catch more drug dealers or illegal
immigrants . . . • The negative impact of such profiling is far reaching . . . it subjects
thousands of innocent people to the kind of inconvenience and humiliation most of us
associate with police states; and it makes law enforcement more difficult by fomenting fear
and distrust among potential witnesses and jurors. These costs far outweigh any law
enforcement benefits.

Stuart Taylor, Jr., Cabbies, Cops, Pizza Deliveries, and Racial Profiling, 32 NAT'L J. 1891,
(2000).
90. Fox Butterfield, A Nation Challenged: The Interviews; Police are Split on
Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,2001, at Al; Laurie Goodstein, A Nation
Challenged: Civil Rights; American Sikhs Contend They Have Become a Focus of Profiling
at Airports, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at B6; Neil A. Lewis, A Nation Challenged:
Immigration Control; l.N.S. to Focus on Muslims Who Evade Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2002, at A12; Edward Walsh, Abusive Behavior, or Racial Profiling?; Airline, Attorneys
Dispute Incident, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2002, at A25.
91. Naftali Bendavid, Bush OK's Terror Tribunals; U.S. Seeks 5,000 Foreign
Nationals for Questioning in Investigation, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14,2001, at 1.
92. Butterfield, supra note 90.
93. Dan Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, U.S. Seeks Thousands of Fugitive Deportees;
Middle Eastern Men Are Focus of Search, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 2002, at AI.

HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 975 2001-2002

976

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:953

demonstrate that ethnic profiling is a legal, much less an effective, response.
The argument that we cannot afford to rely on something other than racial or
ethnic proxies for suspicion, after all, is precisely the rationale used to intern
110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II. While subjecting
an individual to closer inspection and a possible search is far less extreme than
detention, the underlying rationale-that we must use ethnicity as a proxy for
suspicion-is the same.
Precisely because of the history of racial discrimination in this country, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution presumptively forbids government
authorities from relying on such racial or ethnic categories. Such actions
trigger "strict scrutiny," requiring the government to show that its distinctions
are "narrowly tailored" to further a "compelling government interest."94 There
is no question that protecting citizens from terrorism is a compelling
government interest, but so too is drug interdiction-in fact, all criminal law
enforcement would likely be viewed as a compelling state interest. The real
question from a constitutional perspective is whether the means adoptedreliance on ethnic appearance as a proxy for suspicion-is narrowly tailored to
further that interest. It is highly unlikely that profiling could satisfy that
scrutiny.
First, the vast majority of persons who appear Arab and Muslim-probably
well over 99.9 percent-have no involvement with terrorism. Arab and
Muslim appearance, in other words, is a terribly inaccurate proxy. In the sex
discrimination context, where the Supreme Court applies less stringent scrutiny
than it does to ethnic or racial discrimination, the Court has held that statistics
showing that 2 percent of young men between the ages of 18 and 21 had been
arrested for drunk driving did not justify denying men of that age the right to
purchase an alcoholic beverage.95 Surely the percentage of terrorists among
men of Arab appearance is far smaller than the percentage of drunk drivers
among college-age men.
Second, the use of ethnic stereotypes, far from being "necessary" for
effective law enforcement, is likely to be ineffective. When one treats a whole
group of people as presumptively suspicious, it means that agents are more
likely to miss dangerous persons who do not to fit the profile, such as Richard
Reid, the British citizen who boarded a plane in Paris headed for Miami with a
bomb in his shoe.96 In addition, the fact that the vast majority of those targeted
on the basis of their Arab or Muslim appearance will prove to be innocent will
Overbroad ethnic
inevitably cause agents to let their guard down. 97
94. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995).
95. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201-04 (1976).
96. Warren Hoge, A Nation Challenged: The Convert; Shoe-Bomb Suspect Fell in With
Extremists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,2001, atB6.
97. Cf. Malcolm Gladwell, Safety in the Skies; How Far Can Airline Security Go?,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 1, 2001, at 50 (arguing that it is cognitively impossible to remain alert in
reviewing metal detectors at airports because the fact that the vast majority of luggage will
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generalizations, in other words, are not only not narrowly tailored to furthering
effective law enforcement, but may actually undermine effectiveness.
D. Milital)' Tribunals
The fmal example of the double standard at work in our response to
September 11 is President Bush's order creating military tribunals to try
alleged terrorists and Al Qaeda members.98 As noted at the outset, the
Constitution imposes no bar on using the tribunals to try any person who
qualifies as an unlawful combatant, irrespective of citizenship. Yet the
president opted to limit the application of the tribunals to noncitizens. As there
is no legal reason for that justification, one has to wonder why the president
chose to delimit the tribunals in this way, particularly as in all other respects
the order recognized virtually no limits. It seems all too likely that this was a
politically opportunistic decision, fully in keeping with the rest of the postSeptember 11 response that I have described above. If citizens were subject to
the tribunals, citizens would have a much more immediate interest in
overseeing and limiting the president's assertion of power. The president's
military tribunals are extraordinary, as they do away with any independent
judicial review, and make the determination of guilt a matter of military
judgment. Moreover, they permit the use of classified evidence, presented ex
parte and in camera, to convict suspects, and do not permit access to that
evidence by anyone outside the military chain of command.99 Such measures
may or may not be justified in wartime, but the important point for purposes of
this article is that it was politics, not law, that limited exposure to the tribunals
to noncitizens.
In all of these responses to the attacks of September 11, the government
has targeted immigrants. Some measures will undoubtedly have spillover
effects on citizens. Profiling on the basis of Arab appearance, for example, will
affect Arab-looking citizens as well as noncitizens. But most are, at least on
their face, limited to noncitizens. With few exceptions, we have not sought to
impose similar burdens on citizens. Citizens are not subject to massive
preventive detention under extreme secrecy, are not penalized for their speech,
cannot be detained on the Attorney General's say-so, have not been targeted for
questioning or prioritized law enforcement initiatives because of their national
origin, and, as John Walker Lindh illustrates, are not subject to military
tribunals. In the following sections, I will show that this double standard is
constitutionally and normatively wrong, counterproductive as a security matter,
and may well pave the way for the extension of these measures to citizens.
pose no threat inevitably causes security personnel to let their guard down).
98. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
99. See generally Ronald Dworkin, The Trouble with the Tribunals, N.Y. REv. OF
BOOKS, Apr. 25, 2002, at 10.
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III. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS

The critique leveled above presumes that there is something wrong with
treating immigrants differently from citizens. But is there? If aliens are
differently situated from citizens, then treating them differently would not
violate basic norms of equality and dignity, but would simply reflect that they
are in fact different. There is nothing wrong with a double standard where
relevant considerations warrant the application of separate rules.
Defenders of the administration maintain that we need not extend the same
rights to foreigners that we extend to citizens. Aliens have taken no oath of
loyalty to this country and presumably maintain their principal fidelity
elsewhere. And surely it is not irrational to treat Arab and Muslim aliens
differently now, in light of the fact that AI Qaeda, the organization apparently
responsible for the September 11 attacks, is comprised almost exclusively of
Arab and Muslim noncitizens and has threatened to carry out further terrorist
acts against American civilians. AI Qaeda doesn't issue identify cards or
passports, so we can't easily identity its members, but we do know that they are
likely to consist of young Arab or Muslim men.
But the fact that it may not be irrational to focus more closely on Arab and
Muslim immigrants than on other persons does not resolve whether it is fair to
deny those immigrants basic constitutional rights. In particular, it does not
justify denying them the basic guarantees of due process, political freedom, and
equal protection. Were an Asian-American gang to launch a series of violent
attacks on residents of New York City, it might justify paying more attention to
those who might be members of the gang, but it would not warrant denying
gang members, much less those who merely share their ethnic identity, basic
constitutional rights.
Similarly, the issue of loyalty and oaths is a red herring. Most citizens do
not take an oath of loyalty either; they become citizens by the accident of birth,
not by passing any test of commitment. And while one might roughly presume
that citizens will be loyal to the countries of which they are citizens, where we
are at war with no nation, there is no basis for a presumption of conflicting
loyalties based on national origin. Most fundamentally, there is simply nothing
in the nature of the rights of due process, political freedom, and equal
protection that would warrant imposing a threshold requirement of loyalty.
The Constitution does distinguish in some respects between the rights of
citizens and noncitizens. But in fact, relatively little turns on citizenship status.
The right to vote and the right to run for federal elective office are restricted to
citizens, but all of the other rights are written without such limitation. Thus,
the First and Fourth Amendments protect the rights of "the people," while the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, as well as the Equal
Protection Clause, extend their protections to all "persons." The rights
attaching to criminal trials apply to "the accused." As the Court has noted, the
fact that the Framers knew how to limit rights to citizens, and chose to so limit
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only the right to vote and run for office, indicates that the other rights are not so
limited. Specifically, the Court has stated that neither the First nor the Fifth
Amendment "acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident
aliens" 100 For more than a century, the Court has recognized that the Equal
Protection Clause is ''universal in [its] application to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to differences of ... nationality." 101
Similarly, the Court has repeatedly stated that "the Due Process Clause applies
to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." 102 And when
noncitizens, no matter what their status, are tried for crimes, they are entitled to
all of the rights that attach to the criminal process. 103
There are good reasons for this. First, the rights articulated in the Bill of
Rights were viewed by many at the time not as a set of optional contractual
provisions enforceable because they were agreed upon by a group of states and
extending only to the contracting parties, but as inalienable natural rights that
fmd their provenance in God. 104 While natural law theories no longer hold
100. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (construing
immigration regulation permitting exclusion of aliens on secret evidence not to apply to a
returning permanent resident alien because of the substantial constitutional concerns that
such an application would present).
101. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369 (1886).
102. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct 2491, 2500 (2001); see also
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,77 (1976) (holding that due process applies to all aliens in the
United States, even those whose presence is ''unlawful, involuntary, or transitory").
103. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See also Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy. J., concurring) (arguing that aliens are protected
by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896) (holding that aliens charged with crimes are protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698. 724 (1893)
(observing that aliens are entitled to all "the safeguards of the Constitution, and to the
protection of the laws, in regard to their rights of person of property, and to their civil and
criminal responsibility"); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (noting
that aliens have a constitutional right to invoke habeas corpus). Chief Justice Rehnquist
suggested some limitation on the rights of some aliens in the United States in his plurality
opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990), in which he
suggested that an alien who had been involuntarily brought into this country for criminal
prosecution was not part of "the people" eligible to invoke the Fourth Amendment.
However, he was unable to gamer a majority for that view, and Justice Kennedy, whose vote
was necessary to the majority in that case, expressly rejected Rehnquist's suggestion that the
Fourth Amendment did not extend to all persons present in the United States. 494 U.S. at
276-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy rested instead on the fact that the search took
place beyond our borders, a factor also relied upon by Rehnquist /d. at 278.
104. See generally Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1127 (1987). The debate that accompanied the enactment and ultimate demise of
the Alien and Sedition Acts suggests that there was in fact substantial disagreement about
the status of aliens' rights in the early years of the republic, at least in a time of crisis. In
debating the Alien Act, critics, mostly Republicans, pointed to the broad language of the Bill
of Rights and the legal obligations we imposed on all persons residing within our territory as
support for the notion that aliens were entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights. Others,
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much influence, the human rights movement of the last 50 years reflects a
similar understanding that there are certain basic rights to which all persons are
entitled, simply by virtue of being persons. 105 The rights of political freedom,
due process, and equal protection, in other words, are part of the minimal set of
rights that the world has come to demand of any free society. In the words of
the Supreme Court, these rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."to6
Second, as Alexander Bickel has argued, our experience with delimiting
rights on the basis of citizenship should give us pause. 107 The Supreme Court's
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford108 sought to defme away Dred Scott's rights
by concluding that "persons who are descendants of Africans who were
imported into this country, and sold as slaves," were not citizens and therefore
could not invoke federal court jurisdiction. 109 The Court reasoned that when
the Constitution was adopted, blacks were not protected by its provisions,
because they were "considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or
not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but
such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant
them." 110 With the express intent of overruling that reasoning, Congress
provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that "all persons born in the United
States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States ...." 111 The same Congress
enacted the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided that all persons born or
naturalized in the United States are citizens, and further guaranteed to all
persons in the United States-whether citizen or not--due process of law and
mostly Federalists, maintained that the Constitution was a more limited document that
protected only "we the people."
See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FuNDAMENTAL LAW 52-63 (1996). But as with
the Sedition Act, so with the Alien Act, those espousing the more inclusive, rights-protective
views ultimately prevailed. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964)
(relying on history of repudiation of Sedition Act as evidence for importance of protecting
political dissent under First Amendment).
105. The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world ...." G.A.
Res. 217A(ill), U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, U.N. Doc. N810 (1948).
106. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
107. ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33-54 (1975).
108. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
109. !d. at 403.
llO. !d. at 404-405. The Court eerily echoed this statement almost 100 years later
when it held that an alien seeking admission to the country, and in detention on Ellis Island,
could assert no constitutional objection to the fact that she was being excluded on the basis
of secret evidence that she had no opportunity to confront because "[w]hatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."
United States ex rei. Knauff v. Shaugnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
111. Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
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equal protection. As Bickel argues, Dred Scott teaches that "[a] relationship
between government and the governed that turns on citizenship can always be
dissolved or denied [because] [c]itizenship is a legal construct, an abstraction, a
theory." 112 It is far more difficult to deny that a human being is a "person."
Third, the fact that the Constitution denies aliens the right to vote makes it
that much more essential that the basic rights reflected in the Bill of Rights be
extended to aliens in our midst. As a group that is subject to government
regulation but denied a vote, aliens are without a meaningful voice in the
political bargains struck by our representative system. Members of Congress
have little reason to concern themselves with the rights and interests of those
who cannot vote. Thus, as John Hart Ely has argued, aliens' interests will
almost by definition be undercounted in the political process; they are a
"relatively easy case" of a "discrete and insular minority" deserving of
heightened protection. 113 When one adds to this the ignoble history of antiimmigrant sentiment among the voting citizenry, usually laced with racial
animus, aliens are a group particularly warranting judicial protection. 114
The extension of basic constitutional rights to noncitizens must be
qualified in at least three significant respects, however. First, immigrants are
subject to the immigration power, which the Court has historically treated with
substantial deference as a "plenary power." As a result, "Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."115 At the most
basic level, immigrants can be expelled from the country, often for very minor
infractions. Citizens, by contrast, cannot be banished and cannot have their
citizenship taken away. The plenary power doctrine is often overstated,
however, and has been subject to widespread criticism. 116 Just last term the
Supreme Court summarily rejected the government's assertion of plenary
power in a case involving indefinite detention of criminal aliens who had been
ordered deported but whose deportation could not be effectuated, with the
statement that the plenary power "is subject to important constitutional
limitations." 117 Congress has broad leeway-one might say "plenary power''-to

112. BICKEL, supra note 107, at 53.
113. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
161-62 (1980). Ely notes that "[a]liens cannot vote in any state, which means that any
representation they receive will be exclusively 'virtual,"' that aliens have been the subject of
substantial prejudice throughout our history, that recent immigrants in particular tend to live
fairly discrete and unassirnilated lives, and that "our legislatures are composed almost
entirely of citizens who have always been such." Id. at 161.
114. Interestingly, while citizenship is a constitutional prerequisite to running for
president or Congress, the political branches, it is not a requirement for those who make up
the federal judiciary responsible for enforcing constitutional rights.
115. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
116. STEPHENLEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY 177-222 (1987); NEUMAN,
supra note 104, at 118-38; Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A
Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HAR.v. L. REv. 853 (1987).
117. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2501 (2001); see also Carlson
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make substantive policy judgments in many areas, including, for example, the
regulation of commerce, but that does not authorize it to violate other
provisions of the Constitution in doing so. us
The existence of the federal immigration power means that while the Equal
Protection Clause indisputably protects noncitizens living among us, u9 not all
distinctions based on alienage are necessarily suspect. The federal government
may treat aliens differently from citizens in a variety of ways without thereby
violating equal protection, so long as it has a rational basis for doing so. 120 But
distinctions between citizens and aliens do not generally justify differential
application of First Amendment speech and association rights or Fifth
Amendment due process protections. 121
Second, the extension of basic constitutional rights to aliens is complicated
by territorial concerns. The Court has historically treated aliens within our
jurisdiction very differently from those outside our border. As the Court noted
last term, "it is well established that certain constitutional protections available
to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our
geographic borders. But once an alien enters the country, the legal
circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons'
within the United States ...." 122
This distinction, too, has often been overstated. The case most often cited
for the proposition, United States ex. rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 123 involved a
challenge to the procedures used to decide a request for admission to the
country by an initial entrant. The Court reasoned that aliens have no right to
enter the country and therefore may not object on due process grounds to the
procedures used. But that result does not compel the far broader conclusion
that aliens outside our borders have no constitutional rights. Rather, it may
simply reflect the proposition-equally applicable to citizens-that where a
statute does not create an entitlement, no "liberty" or "property" interest is
implicated, and therefore due process does not attach. 124 Since Knauff had no
v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952) (noting that "the power to expel aliens .... is, of
course, subject to judicial intervention under the 'paramount law of the Constitution."'
(internal ci~tions omitted)).
118. See, e.g. Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S 93, 98 (1994)
(observing that Congress has plenary power over interstate commerce); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment limits power of Congress to
regulate states pursuant to Commerce Clause); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364, 376 (1984) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds a federal statute prohibiting
noncommercial educational broadcasting stations which received grants from the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting from editorializing, while confirming that Congress can
regulate broadcasting under its plenary Commerce Clause power).
119. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
120. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
121. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953).
122. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2500.
123. 338 u.s. 537 (1950).
124. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461
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entitlement to enter, but was merely seeking a gratuitous benefit, she had
neither a liberty nor a property interest sufficient to trigger due process
protection, just as a convicted prisoner has no liberty or property interest in a
pardon, and therefore may not challenge the procedures by which pardons are
granted. On this view, aliens outside of our border might indeed have
constitutional rights where we are not merely denying them a gratuitous
benefit, but are affmnatively exercising sovereign authority over them and
subjecting them to the obligations of our legal system. 125 Thus, while a decision
to deny entry to an alien might not trigger due process, a decision to detain an
entering alien would trigger due process limitations, because to do so is to
deprive the person of physical liberty, and "[f]reedom from
imprisonment ... lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause
protects." 126 In any event, the vast majority of the anti-terrorism initiatives
discussed here affect aliens residing among us, and those, such as military
tribunals, that may apply to aliens abroad arise in settings where we are seeking
to impose U.S. legal obligations.
Finally, the Court has always treated the rights of "enemy aliens" as
categorically different from the rights of citizens, and indeed of all other aliens.
The Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Enemy Alien Act, which
authorizes the President in a declared war to detain, deport, or otherwise restrict
the freedom of any citizen 14 years of age or older of the country with which
we are at war. 127 And in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 128 the Court held that enemy
U.S. 238, 248-49 (1983) (holding that state prison regulations did not create a liberty interest
implicated by a transfer to another state); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458
(1981) (ruling that neither a state statute empowering the Board of Pardons to commute
sentences nor the Board's practice of commuting three-fourths of life sentences created a
liberty interest requiring due process in review of applications for commutation); Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (finding that prison inmates had no liberty interest implicated
in being transferred to another prison); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972)
(holding that an untenured professor had no property interest in being rehired and therefore
no due process objection to the procedures used to reach that decision); Tefel v. Reno, 180
F.3d 1286, 1300 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that various actions taken by the INS to encourage
aliens to apply for suspension of deportation did not create a liberty interest protected by due
process).
125. See NEUMAN, supra note 104, at 108-17 (arguing that aliens should have
constitutional rights abroad where the United States imposes its sovereign legal obligations
on them).
126. Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct at 2498; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80
(1992) ("[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection" (internal citations omitted)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) ("Without doubt, [liberty] denotes ... freedom from bodily restraint.").
Admittedly, Knauff and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953),
suggest that detention of arriving aliens does not change the constitutional calculus, but in
that respect they may be wrongly decided. Moreover, it may be that those entering aliens
who can freely leave the country have the "keys to the cell," and therefore cannot complain
of their detention while their admissability is determined.
127. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). See 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2002).
128. 339 u.s. 763 (1950).
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aliens captured on the battlefield abroad had no right to seek habeas corpus in a
United States court to challenge their subjection to military trial. 129 The Court
noted that at common law, an enemy alien had no rights during a time of war, 130
and that the United States "regards him as part of the enemy resources." 131 But
these principles apply only in a time of declared war to citizens of the country
with which we are at war. Thus, they should not be generalized to justify
treatment of aliens when, as now, no war has been declared, and there is no
identifiable enemy nation. The Supreme Court was careful to note in
Eisentrager that the power to treat enemy aliens is "an incident of war and
not ... an incident of alienage." 132 It is critical to honor that distinction, the
Court warned, because '"[m]uch of the obscurity which surrounds the rights of
aliens has its origin in this confusion of diverse subjects.'" 133
Thus, while the rights of aliens are undoubtedly qualified in certain
circumstances, these circumstances do not justify the imposition of a double
standard across the board. Rather, they suggest that outside of a declared war
against an identifiable nation, aliens living among us are entitled to those
constitutional rights not expressly restricted to citizens, including most
critically the rights of due process, political freedom, and equal protection.
The constitutional arguments made in this section should impel us to
respect immigrants' speech, associational, and due process rights as fully as our
own even in those settings where infringing aliens' rights might advance our
security. Most constitutional rights, as restrictions on the exercise of sovereign
authority, potentially impede government efforts to make the nation more
secure. That is an inevitable cost of a limited government. At the same time,
most constitutional rights have not been interpreted as absolutes, but as
presumptive prohibitions rebuttable by compelling showings of need and
narrow tailoring. Thus, for example, the First Amendment right of free speech
reflects a presumption of protection that is overridden where speech is intended
and likely to incite imminent lawless action. 134 My claim is not that such
categorical balancing is inappropriate, but that we must not cheat on the
balance by drawing the line differently with respect to aliens and citizens.
Aliens' speech may be punished, but only if it meets the Brandenburg standard.
Aliens' liberty may be deprived, but only pursuant to the same procedural
safeguards we demand for citizens. Thus, while the definition of most
constitutional rights contains an implicit consequentialist balance, the balance
should be struck equally for all-even if it might be convenient or effective to
strike it differently for some. As shown below, however, there is also good

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

!d. at 785.
!d. at 774 n.6.
!d. at 773.
!d. at 772.
!d. (quoting Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 237 (1920) (Cardozo, J.)).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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reason to believe that reliance on double standards will in fact make us less, not
more secure.
IV.

SECURITY AND EQUAL TREATMENT

In addition to the constitutional and normative reasons for according aliens
living here the same basic rights that we insist upon for ourselves, our interest
in security argues in favor of doing so. When law enforcement fails to abide by
the basic dictates of political freedom, due process, and equal protection, it
almost inevitably surrenders legitimacy, and thereby triggers a reaction in the
targeted community that will ultimately create further problems. In the "war
on terrorism," this loss of legitimacy has implications both at home and abroad.
At home, let us suppose-as the Justice Department apparently does-that
there may be terrorist threats living among us, and that given what we know
about the makeup of AI Qaeda, they are likely to be Arab and Muslim
immigrants. The question for law enforcement is how to identify individuals
who have no visible markers. The possibility that AI Qaeda may have
"sleeper" cells in the country-groups of committed terrorists who are living
quiet, law-abiding lives while awaiting a sign to act-makes the problem of
identification and prevention that much more daunting.
There are two ways to go about solving this problem. One is characterized
by most of what the Justice Department has done in the wake of September 11.
In the absence of good intelligence, it has cast an extremely wide net, treating
people as potential suspects based on little more than the fact that they are Arab
or Muslim immigrant males, and has sought to sweep up and detain hundreds
of persons without any criminal charges. The questioning of 5,000 immigrants
and the decision to prioritize the deportation of 6,000 others who have
remained despite having fmal deportation orders, both based essentially on the
fact that they are male noncitizens from Arab countries, reflects such a
philosophy. So, too, do the detentions of approximately 2000 aliens, most on
routine immigration charges, only one of whom has been charged with
involvement in the events of September 11. Ethnic profiling by local and
federal law enforcement officials and airport security personnel also fits this
pattern.
These methods are unlikely to be effective for two reasons. First, when the
government departs from individual culpability and adopts guilt by association
or suspicion by ethnicity as guiding principles, it encourages sloppy policing
and wasteful expenditure of resources on the innocent. The proxies of ethnicity
and political or religious association are so inexact and overbroad that the vast
majority of those questioned or detained are certain to be wholly innocent. The
predominance of "false positives" will likely lead investigators to drop their
guard and to be less attentive to those who really warrant attention. 135
135. See Gladwell, supra note 97.
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Moreover, the broader the suspicion, the more time and resources will be
wasted pursuing innocent people. To cite one example, the federal government
has now been attempting to deport a group of seven Palestinians and a Kenyan
in Los Angeles for 15 years. (I have been defending the group for the same
period of time). The group came to the FBI's attention in the early 1980s in
connection with counterterrorism investigations relating to the 1984 Los
Angeles Olympics. Most of the eight were college students at the time, and
were vocally supportive of Palestinian self-determination. The FBI spent three
years investigating them, including video and electronic surveillance, renting a
home next door to two of the individuals for six months, and frequent spells of
24-hour round-the-clock surveillance. One of the things the students did was to
organize annual dinners for the Palestinian community. The events were
widely publicized and open to anyone. As many as 1,000 people attended,
including many families and children. The events included Palestinian food,
music, dancing, and speeches. In addition, at the close of the evening there was
generally a charitable fundraising pitch. Suspecting that these events may be
linked to terrorism, FBI agents attended one of the events, and wrote a report
on the event as follows:
The Federal Agents observing the fund raiser did not speak or
understand the Arabic language, however, from the posters of
Palestinians with AK-47 assaults [sic] rifles and the general mood or
tone of the speeches, the agents realized that the PFLP was not
attempting to raise money for a humanitarian cause. The music and
entire mood of the fund raiser from the entrance ceremony through the
speeches sounded militaristic.I 36

The fact that the FBI would not even bother to have someone attend the
event who could speak Arabic is an illustration of what happens when one
proceeds under a principle of guilt by association. If all one needs to prove is
association, one need not do the difficult work of determining whether in fact
the individuals are engaged in any criminal or terrorist activity. In the end, the
FBI concluded that it had no evidence that any of the individuals had
committed any criminal or terrorist activity, but nonetheless urged the INS to
deport them for their political associations.
Second, and more fundamentally, these methods send a message that law
enforcement has targeted a whole community as "alien" or "suspect." That
message cannot help but alienate members of the targeted community,
rendering them far less likely to assist law enforcement in their efforts to
identify true perpetrators. If the community comes to view law enforcement
officials as unjustly suspecting them for their ethnic, political, or religious
identity, an adversarial relationship is likely to arise making law enforcement
more difficult. In this regard, one of the leading spokespersons for the Arab
community, James Zogby, director the Arab-American Institute, recently found
136. Supplemental Excerpts of Record, Volume 2, at 393, American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 96-55929).
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himself in rare agreement with the former counterterrorism chief of the FBI,
both of whom predicted that the Justice Department's plan to interview 5,000
Arab immigrant men would likely backfire because of the division it would
create between law enforcement and the Arab community .137
In the criminal justice area, local police have learned this lesson the hard
way. Crime-fighting tactics that emphasize mass arrests, stop-and-frisk
strategies, and racial profiling, while they may catch more criminals,
undermine the legitimacy of law enforcement in the communities targeted, and
thereby impede effective law enforcement. Witnesses are less likely to come
forward, to work with police and prosecutors, or to testify in court. Moreover,
where the law enforcement system is seen as unfair and illegitimate, there is a
higher likelihood that those in the affected community will be drawn to crime.
Studies have consistently found that those who obey the law do so not because
they fear being apprehended, but because they believe that the rules are fair,
that the system has legitimacy. As everyone who has ever played a leadership
role knows, if people believe in the leader's legitimacy they are much more
likely to do his or her bidding. Once legitimacy is lost, one must resort to the
much less effective strong-arm responses of building more prisons and putting
more police on the streets. 13s
The contrast between Boston's and New York's responses to high crime
rates in their respective inner cities illustrates the point. In Boston, police
reacted to a wave of juvenile homicides in 1992 by reaching out to and working
with religious leaders in the inner city. The religious leaders, who had a
legitimacy in the community that the police lacked, served as a critical
intermediary between the community and the police. Among other things, they
helped identify the true bad actors, which allowed the police to refrain from
broad sweeps that treated every young black male as a suspect. 139
New York City police undertook the opposite approach. They treated the
problem almost as an occupying military force would, using aggressive
enforcement of minor "quality of life" violations as pretexts to stop, search, and
arrest large numbers of young minority men. While both cities experienced a

137. Eric Slater & John Beckham, Response to Terror; The Investigation; U.S. Moves
to Question Mideast Men; Law: Local Officials Face Obstacles in Carrying Out an Order to
Contact About 5,000 Recent Visitors, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at A1 (reporting that "a
former counter-terrorism chief for the FBI said that, while he supports Ashcroft's aggressive
campaign against terrorism, questioning the thousands of men would be counterproductive
because it could breed hostility in Muslim communities in the United States," and also
quoting James Zogby as saying, "It compromises what may be the most important aspect of
the investigation: Arab-police bonds of trust.").
138. I develop these ideas more extensively in DAVID CoLE, No EQUAL JusTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 169-78 (1999).
139. See generally Jenny Berrien, Omar McRoberts & Christopher Winship, Religion
and the Boston Miracle: The Effect of Black Ministry on Youth Violence, in WHO WILL
PROVIDE?: THE CHANGING ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE 266-85 (Mary
Jo Bane, Brent Coffin & Ronald Thiemann eds., 2000).
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drop in crime, New York did so at a tremendous cost, as arrests and complaints
about police abuse both skyrocketed, whereas in Boston the crime rate dropped
dramatically without any increase in either arrests or complaints. As the
reaction to the killing of Amadou Diallo vividly demonstrated, the New York
City police forfeited substantial legitimacy by using such tactics.
Boston's approach is an example of the second way to solve the problem
of identifying true threats within a broader community. From this perspective,
the most effective response in the wake of September 11 might have been to
use the overwhelming shock and revulsion at the attacks here to build a bridge
to the Arab and Muslim communities, seeking their help in identifying the
perpetrators and any further threats that might reside among them. That kind of
outreach, coupled with incentives for assistance, might well have proven far
more effective than the dragnet that thus far has netted only one person charged
with involvement in the September 11 attacks and has generated substantial
outrage and opposition in the targeted communities.
From an international perspective, legitimacy is also critical.
As
September 11 illustrated, terrorism is a transnational phenomenon, and requires
a transnational response. It is in Osama bin Laden's interest, not ours, to
characterize the struggle as the West against Islam or the United States against
Arabs. The more we act in ways that support that picture, the more likely bin
Laden or others will be able to attract adherents to their terrorist cause against
us. At the same time, the willingness of members of the international
community to cooperate with us by providing intelligence and law enforcement
support will turn on the extent to which we are seen as fighting for a broad
principle of justice, rather than for our own parochial self-interest. When we
decline to accord foreign citizens the same respect and basic rights that we
insist upon for ourselves, we undermine the legitimacy of our cause in the
world at large. The president's symbolic outreach to the Muslim community in
the days immediately following the attacks, with a reference here and there to
mosques, and the inclusion of a Muslim cleric in the national memorial service
for September 11, seemed to reflect his administration's understanding that it
must do what it can to undermine the perception that bin Laden seeks to
foster-namely that this is a war of cultures. Yet the administration's actions
have been contrary to its words. While the president urged that Americans not
treat Arabs and Muslims as suspect based on their ethnic or religious identity,
his administration has adopted policies, like the mass detention, interview, and
deportation programs, that seemed to do precisely what the president was
urging the rest of us not to do.
V. TARGETING IMMIGRANTS, HITTING CITIZENS
One of the most common refrains about September 11 is that it "changed
everything." But while much about the attacks was unprecedented, our
response has in fact been disturbingly familiar. As citizens, we have all too

HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 988 2001-2002

May 2002]

ENEMYAUENS

989

often found it convenient to trade immigrants' rights for our own purported
security. From the nation's earliest days, we have deemed immigrants
suspicious based on their racial and ethnic identity and political associations.
We have detained and deported aliens using summary procedures, failing to
treat them as individuals deserving of equal respect and dignity. At critical
moments, we have relied upon alienage as a basis for mass arrests and
detentions.
By selectively targeting immigrants, such measures implicitly or explicitly
assure citizens that their own liberties and rights will be left intact. But that
promise has often proved illusory. While security measures have often been
initially targeted at immigrants, they have just as often laid the groundwork for
future deprivations of citizens' rights as well. What we do to immigrants
creates a precedent that then makes it more thinkable to do the same to citizens.
Thus, from the long view, all citizens have a stake in how we treat aliens in
times of crisis. Unfortunately, not many citizens take the long view.
A. Enemy Aliens and Enemy Races
Two historical examples illustrate how measures initially directed at
immigrants can pave the way for incursions on citizens' rights. The first is the
link between the treatment of "enemy aliens" in wartime and the internment of
persons of Japanese descent-including 70,000 U.S. citizens-in World War II.
Treatment of foreigners as subversive dates back at least to 1798, when,
inspired by fears that the radicalism of the French Revolution might take root
in the United States, Congress enacted the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts. 140
The Alien Act gave the president the power to deport any noncitizen whom he
deemed a threat to the national security. Deported aliens had no recourse to the
courts nor any right to a writ of habeas corpus.'41 The Sedition Act made it a
crime to criticize government officials. 142 The Alien Act was not enforced, and
the Sedition Act was enforced exclusively against Republican critics of the
Federalist administration. Both laws sparked substantial protest, and expired
two years later. Thomas Jefferson pardoned all those convicted under the
Sedition Act. The Supreme Court has interpreted the short-lived history and
swift repudiation of the Sedition Act as important evidence supporting the First

140. JAMES M. SMITII, FREEDOM'S FETIERS 12-49 (1956).
141. JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDffiON ACTS 52-53

(1951).
142. The Act prohibited "false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against
the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress ... or the President ...
with intent to defame [them], or to bring them ... into contempt or disrepute; or to excite
against them ... the hatred of the good people of the United States ...." Act of July 14,
1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
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Amendment principle that political debate must be free from government
control. 143
At the same time that Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts, it also
enacted the Enemy Alien Act While the former were short-lived and are more
important for their rejection than for their application, the Enemy Alien Act
remains on the books to this day. 144 It authorizes the President during a
declared war to detain, expel, or otherwise restrict the freedom of any citizen
14 years or older of the country with which we are at war. It requires no
proceeding to determine whether the individual is in fact suspicious, disloyal,
or dangerous; the act creates an irrebuttable presumption that an enemy alien is
dangerous. In stark contrast to the ignominious and brief history of the Alien
and Sedition Acts, the Enemy Alien Act has been enforced during declared
wars, and was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1948, 145 even when applied to
detain aliens after hostilities had ceased. The Roosevelt Administration used
the Enemy Alien Act during World War II to round up, question, and detain
thousands of German, Italian, and Japanese aliens. 146
The Enemy Alien Act is a precursor to the internment of 110,000 persons
of Japanese ancestry during World War II. The justification for the Enemy
Alien Act is that during a war government should have the power to confine
and neutralize all persons with ties to the country we are fighting, because
aliens are presumptively loyal to their own country, and therefore,
presumptively our enemies. In World War II, we simply extended that
philosophy to Japanese Americans. The Army argued that persons of Japanese
descent, even if they were technically American citizens because they were
born here, remained for all practical purposes "enemy aliens," likely to be loyal
to Japan. Lt. General John L. DeWitt, the driving force behind the internment
orders, wrote in his report on the Japanese evacuation that "[t]he Japanese race
is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on
United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become
'Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted." 147 More colloquially, General
DeWitt testified in 1943 before the House Naval Affairs Committee, that "[a]
Jap's a Jap. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or
not." 148 Secretary of War Henry Stimson concurred, reasoning that "[t]heir
racial characteristics are such that we cannot understand or trust even the

143. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964).
144. 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 21-24 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
145. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171-72 (1948).
146. See JOHN CHRISTGAU, "ENEMIES": WORLD WAR ll ALIEN INTERNMENT (1985).
147. Final Report of General DeWitt, quoted in JACOBUS TENBROEK, EDWARD N.
BARNHART & FLOYD W. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 110 (1954).
148. Brief of Japanese American Citizens League, Amicus Curiae at 198, Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), reprinted in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309-530
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
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citizen Japanese." 149 The Supreme Court accepted the rationale in several cases
reviewing the Japanese curfews and internment. 150 Thus, in Hirabayashi v.
United States, 151 the Court reasoned that "[t]he fact alone that the attack on our
shores was threatened by Japan rather than another enemy power set these
citizens apart from others who have no particular association with Japan."
As these quotations reveal, the "enemy alien" concept was extended not to
all citizens, but to a distinct subset, through the prism of race. The Japanese
alien could not be distinguished from the Japanese-American citizen because,
as General DeWitt put it, "the racial strains are undiluted." Citizens of German
and Italian ancestry were not interned en masse; only the Japanese were. The
linkage between alienage and race has a long history in the United States. In
the mid-nineteenth century, for example, anti-Chinese sentiment in California
led to frequent lynchings, stonings, and beatings of Chinese immigrants, as
well as to laws barring Chinese from testifying in cases involving whites. 152
California Governor John Bigler argued in 1852 "that the Chinese were a moral
evil, that as coolies they were little more than slaves, that they degraded white
labor and were inherently incapable of playing the role of citizens." 153 In 1876,
the California state legislature published "An Address to the People of the
United States on the Evils of Chinese Immigration," 154 and in 1882, Congress
enacted the first Chinese exclusion laws, barring Chinese from entering the
United States. 155 Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted a law requiring Chinese
immigrants already living here to establish the legality of their presence by
presenting the testimony of "one white witness." 156
In 1920, Congress adopted a literacy test for immigrants, designed to keep
out those who could not speak English, and banned virtually all immigration
from Asia. In 1924, Congress enacted national origins quotas on admissions,
based on the proportion of aliens from each country in the United States as of
1890, apparently because using later figures would have admitted more aliens
from Italy, Poland, Greece, and other undesirable countries. A year later, the
Commissioner of Immigration boasted that virtually all immigrants now
"looked" like Americans.1s1
149. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM 215 (1970),
MICHl \VEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S
CONCENTRATION CAMPS 43 (1976).

quoted in

150. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
151. 320 u.s. 81, 101 (1943).
152. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EDWARD N. BARNHART & FLOYD W. MATSON, PREJUDICE,
\VARANDTHECONSTITUTION 15-16 (1954).
153. /d. at 18.
154. /d. at 17.
155. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
156. Geary Act of 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).
157. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, & HlR.OSID MOTOMURA,
IM?\fiGRATION AND CITIZENSIDP: PROCESS AND POLICY 165 (4th ed. 1998).
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In the period immediately preceding World War IT, both the federal and
state governments adopted a wide range of anti-Japanese measures, denying
people of Japanese ancestry the right to naturalize, to own property, and to
work in several industries based solely on their ethnic identity. 158 Like the
Chinese before them, the Japanese were considered unassimilable, a breed
apart, and an inferior race. 159 In this atmosphere, measures targeted at the
Japanese occasioned little popular objection. As one account describes the
World War IT period,
[T]he position of American citizens of Japanese descent, theoretically more
secure [than that of aliens], was almost equally precarious. Regarded
generally as 'descendants of the Japanese enemy,' they found their status as
citizens more and more in jeopardy. The confusion of alien ancestry with
alien status was compounded in the public mind as newspapers referred
indiscriminately to all Japanese-whether citizens or aliens, enemy forces or
peaceful residents-as 'Japs.' ... [T]he cry of 'once a Jap, always a Jap' was
heard on all sides. 160

The difference of the Japanese-a difference founded initially on alienage
but ultimately on race-made it easier for the majority to accept measures
targeted at them, because that difference simultaneously facilitated deeply
rooted stereotypes, diminished empathy, and offered assurances that the same
fate would not befall the majority. The close interrelationship between antiAsian racism and anti-immigrant sentiment made the transition from "enemy
alien" to "enemy race" a disturbingly smooth one.
The role that racial stereotypes played in the transition is underscored by
the fact that there was no evidence to support the concern that the Japanese
living among us posed a threat. In arguments that eerily foreshadow the
"sleeper" theories advanced about Al Qaeda today, government officials argued
that the fact that Japanese aliens and citizens living among us had taken no
subversive action yet only underscored how dangerous they were. Earl
Warren, then governor of California, argued, "It seems to me that it is quite
significant that in this great state of ours we have had no fifth column activities
and no sabotage reported. It looks very much to me as though it is a studied
effort not to have any until the zero hour arrives." 161 General DeWitt argued
similarly that the lack of any evidence of sabotage by the Japanese to date "is a
disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken." 162

158.
159.
MATSON,
160.
161.
162.

TENBROEK, BARNHART & MATSON, supra note 152, at 33-67.
See generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983); TENBROEK, BARNHART &
supra note 152.
TENBROEK, BARNHART & MATSON, supra note 152, at 81.

!d. at 83-84.
!d. at 110. See also id. at 92 ("Local, state, and national officials voiced the
conviction that the absence of sabotage in the present makes it all the more certain in the
future.").
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In retrospect, however, history has vindicated dissenting Justice Frank
Murphy's view in Korematsu 163 that the Japanese internment was "one of the
most sweeping and complete deprivations of constitutional rights in the history
of this nation in the absence of martiallaw." 164 Eight of the nine sitting Justices
on today's Supreme Court have stated that it was wrongly decided; Justice
Scalia has placed Korematsu on a par with Dred Scott. 165 Congress has paid
reparations, and Fred Korematsu's conviction has been overturned. 166
But the Enemy Alien Act remains on the books. And some, including
Chief Justice Rehnquist, have argued that the error of the internment plan lay
only in its extension to citizens; had it been limited to the 40,000 Japanese
aliens, Rehnquist reasons, it would have been constitutionally justified. 167 In
the Chief Justice's estimation, in other words, the error was not in making
assumptions based on racial stereotypes, but in making assumptions about
citizens based on racial stereotypes.
In my view, the error is much more fundamental. The Japanese internment
during World War II was not an isolated mistake that happened to harm 70,000
citizens, but an action fully in keeping with prevailing anti-Japanese popular
sentiment that predated but was obviously exacerbated by the war. The error
was to treat people as dangerous and to intern them not based on their
individual conduct, but on the basis of their group identity. It was as wrong to
apply that reasoning to aliens as it was to apply it to citizens. But more
significantly, the fact that the internment extended to citizens illustrates how

163. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
164. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
165. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also
Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.) ("Korematsu demonstrates vividly
that even 'the most rigid scrutiny' can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial
classification. . . . Any retreat from the most searching judicial inquiry can only increase the
risk of another such error occurring in the future."); id. at 244 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined by Ginsburg, J.) (referring to the "shameful'' burdens that the government imposed on
Japanese Americans during World War IT, some of which the Court upheld in Korematsu);
id. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.) ("[T]he enduring lesson one should
draw from Korematsu" is that "scrutiny the Court described as 'most rigid' nonetheless
yielded a pass for an odious, gravely injurious racial classification."); Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.) ("Even strict
scrutiny may not have sufficed to invalidate early race-based laws of most doubtful validity,
as we learned in Korematsu."). Only Justice Souter has yet to weigh in. I am indebted to
Professor Eric Muller for this point.
166. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Civil Liberties
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (acknowledging "fundamental
injustice" of internment and providing restitution for all persons ordered to leave their
homes).
167. REHNQUIST, supra note 16, at 208-11 (1998). This argument sheds new light on
Rehnquiest' s suggestion that "civil liberties" are the liberties of "citizens." See supra note
16.
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anti-alien measures can pave the way for serious inroads on citizens' liberties
as well.
·
Some have argued that the fact that Arabs and Muslims have not been
interned en masse in the wake of September 11 shows that we have learned
from our past mistakes. But that seems far too optimistic a reading. The threat
we face today, while terrifying, pales in comparison to that which we faced
during World War II. And while the Japanese were a very small minority in
the United States in the 1940s, there are many millions of Arabs and Muslims
interspersed throughout American society, making anything like mass
internment so impractical that it is not even contemplated. At the same time,
however, we have targeted immigrants based on their Arab identity, and in
doing so have fallen prey to the same kind of ethnic stereotyping that
characterized the fundamental error of the Japanese internment. And
particularly in the realm of ethnic profiling, we have once again extended antiimmigrant measures to United States citizens through the prism of race.
B. Alien Radicals and Radical Citizens
Measures directed at aliens can also extend to citizens through the prism of
politics. Thus, a second example of anti-alien initiatives laying a foundation
for incursions on citizens' rights can be found in the connections between
efforts to target "alien radicals" during the early part of the twentieth century
and the more broad-based anti-Communist measures of the 1940s and early
1950s under Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activites
Committee. Here, the common currency was political association, as efforts to
suppress Communist aliens transformed into a war on Communists irrespective
of citizenship.
The story begins, at least at the level of national legislation, with Leon
Czolgosz's assassination of President McKinley in 1902. Czolgosz was a
United States citizen, but he had a foreign-sounding name, and that was enough
to spur Congress to enact immigration laws barring entry to anarchists and
other aliens who advocated "the overthrow by force or violence of the
Government of the United States or of all government or of all forms oflaw." 163
Congress considered but rejected bills that would have imposed similar
prohibitions on the political activities of U.S. citizens. 169 Over the next thirty
years, through and following World War I, the federal government consistently
targeted alien radicals, deporting them with summary procedures for their
speech or associations, making little effort to distinguish true threats from
ideological dissidents.
168. Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214 (1903), repealed by
Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 38, 39 Stat. 874, 897 (1917). See also
WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 19031933, at 208-37 (1963).
169. PRESTON, supra note 168, at 31-32.
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Many of the early targets were members of the Industrial Workers of the
World (IWW). Created in 1905, the IWW organized unskilled workers and
was deeply critical of capitalism. After several prominent IWW strikes in 1916
and 1917, law enforcement turned to immigration law as a tactic for attacking
the IWW. As William Preston describes, prosecutors saw "deportation as the
most flexible and discretionary weapon available for their attack upon radical
labor agitators." 170 This was because the immigration law supported theories of
guilt by association, and "[p]roof of individual guilt was the greatest stumbling
block in labor disturbances." 171 In Seattle, a focal point for many of the
deportation cases, government officials "argued that an alien's support of the
[IWW] automatically helped to spread its doctrines. An individual could
therefore 'advocate' [illegal doctrine] simply by paying his dues or contributing
to a defense fund." 172
This first "Red Scare" culminated in the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920. In
April 1919, a large-scale bomb plot was discovered. 173 All but one of the
bombs were discovered in transit; the packages were addressed to immigration
officials, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the chairman of the
Senate Bolshevik Investigation Committee, Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer, and other leaders. 174 No one was ever arrested for the bomb plot, but
everyone agreed action had to be taken or, as the press said, "we may as well
invite Lenin and Trotsky to come here and set up business at once." 175 On June
2, bombs exploded in eight different cities within the same hour; two people
were killed, and the attorney general's home in Washington, D.C. was bombed.
The bomber of Palmer's home was killed in the explosion, and fragments of his
clothing and body indicated that he was an Italian alien from Philadelphia. 176
In response, the federal government began a series of dragnet raids directed
at deporting radical aliens, under the guidance of the Justice Department's
"alien radical" division, headed by a young J. Edgar Hoover. 177 The
government relied heavily on confessions, extracted without lawyers present, to
provide a factual basis for the deportations. When progressive union lawyers
produced a pamphlet entitled "Our Constitutional Rights, Notice to Aliens,"
advising aliens to remain silent and to consult a lawyer before answering
questions, the government at Hoover's urging changed the rules to provide that
an alien's right to be represented by counsel began not upon arrest, but only at

170. Id. at 100.
171. Id.; see also id. at 164-65, 180.
172. Id. at 173; see also id. at 184 (observing that in July 1918, the INS adopted this
argument as official policy).
173. ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920,
at 69-71 (1955).
174. Id. at 71.
175. Id. at 72.
176. Id. at 78-79.
177. PRESTON, supra note 168, at 210.
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the beginning of an immigration hearing, well after interrogation had been
completed. 178
The first Palmer raid was conducted on November 7, 1919. Raids
continued into January 1920. In all, federal and local officials arrested between
4,000 and 10,000 individuals. As one historian described them, the raids
involved
[i]ndiscriminate arrests of the innocent with the guilty, unlawful searches and
seizures by federal detectives, intimidating preliminary interrogations of aliens
held incommunicado, high-handed levying of excessive bail, and denial of
counsel .... The Department of Justice concerned itself with the preservation
of its informers rather than with the protection of the rights of alien
defendants. Sworn and extorted confession became the substitute for due
process. 179

Hoover specifically urged immigration authorities to set bail sufficiently high
to make release impossible, because if aliens were set free, the rule change
designed to permit interrogations without counsel would be "virtually of no
value." 180 Prisoners were beaten, interrogated incommunicado, and detained
for months.
The public response was not heartening. The Washington Post proclaimed
that "[t]here is no time to waste on hairsplitting over infringement of liberty." 181
Meanwhile, Attorney General Palmer defended the raids by ruthless description
of the targets: "[o]ut of the sly and crafty eyes of many of them leap cupidity,
cruelty, insanity, and crime; from their lopsided faces, sloping brows, and
misshapen features may be recognized the unmistakable criminal type." 182
Louis Post, Acting Secretary of Labor in March 1920, who was responsible for
releasing or deporting the remaining detainees, later complained that the laws
forced him "to order deportations of many aliens whom not even a lynching
mob with the least remnant of righteous spirit would have deported from a
frontier town." 183
The more familiar McCarthy era of the 1940s and 1950s essentially
replicated the abuses of this first "red scare," but this time directed at citizens
as well. 184 There were 300 federal, state, and local laws enacted against
Communist "subversives," and the House Committee on Un-American
Activities compiled an index of one million suspects. 185 Guilt by association
was the watchword, as loyalty oaths, blacklists, registration requirements, and
congressional inquiries sought to identify and penalize those who were

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

!d. at 214-18; MURRAY, supra note 173, at 211.
PRESTON, supra note 168, at 221.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 217.
/d. at 219.
Robert D. Warth, The Palmer Raids, 48 S. A1LANTIC Q. 1, 18 (1949).
SABIN, supra note 12, at27-28.
PRESTON, supra note 168, at 291.
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sympathetic to or associated with the Communist Party, irrespective of their
involvement in any otherwise illegal activity. Communists were denied
teaching positions at state universities, admission to the bar, passports for travel
abroad, security clearances for work in defense facilities, and employment in
Hollywood. They were imprisoned, deported, and subjected to public
harassment.
As with the Japanese internment, in retrospect we recognize that the
McCarthy era tactics were not merely a mistake, but unconstitutional. While
the Supreme Court initially tacitly permitted guilt by association, 186 it
ultimately ruled, after McCarthy's censure, that both the First Amendment right
of association and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause preclude
imposition of criminal or even civil liability for association absent specific
intent to further a group's illegal ends. 187 In our jurisprudence, the Court
reasoned, "guilt is personal," 188 and "[i]f there were a ... blanket prohibition of
association with a group having both legal and illegal aims, there would indeed
be a real danger that legitimate political expression or association would be
impaired ...." 189
As with the Japanese internment, so in the McCarthy era, law enforcement
measures initially targeted at aliens paved the way for measures later extended
to citizens. In both instances, what made the extension possible was a
proclivity to treat people as suspicious not based on individual conduct, but on
group identity-be it ethnic or political. And as with the Japanese internment,
the courts and the country initially went along with the extension. Only later,
after many thousands of Americans had been harmed, did the Court and the
country recognize the constitutional infirmities in treating people as guilty not
for their individual conduct but for their group associations.
C. History Repeats Itself
More recent history, including the decade or so preceding September 11,
tells a disturbingly similar story. Here, too, law enforcement authorities
selectively targeted immigrants' rights, and then extended analogous treatment
to citizens. One of my own first cases, as a young lawyer for the Center for
Constitutional Rights in 1985, was the defense of Margaret Randall, a 50-yearold grandmother, poet, author, and photographer who was denied permanent
resident status and ordered deported because she had advocated "the doctrines
of world communism" in her written work. 190 As I listened to government
186. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. I
(1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); SABIN, supra note 12, at 68-89.
187. See supra note 62.
188. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224 (1961).
189. Id. at 229.
190. Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988); David Cole, What's a
Metaphor?: The Deportation of a Poet, 1 YALEJ. L. & LmERATION 10 (1989).

HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 997 2001-2002

998

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:953

lawyers in an El Paso immigration courtroom cross-examine Randall about the
fact that a poetry magazine she once edited had been described as a
"revolutionary weapon," I felt as if I had been transported to another time.
Such claims, I had thought, were a bygone relic of the McCarthy era and no
longer a feature of our legal landscape.
That we were even on trial was dependent upon the United States' view
that Randall was not a citizen. She had been born in the United States, but had
taken Mexican citizenship in the 1960s while married to a Mexican poet, out of
a desire to find employment to support their family. The State Department
determined that she had forfeited her citizenship in so doing. Were Randall a
United States citizen, of course, she would not have been in deportation
proceedings, but more broadly, the government could not have taken any action
against her based on her advocacy of communism, much less the fact that her
poetry magazine had once been described as a "revolutionary weapon."
Randall eventually prevailed on appeal, on the argument that she had never in
fact lost her U.S. citizenship. In other words, she won her case precisely by
insisting upon the line between citizen and alien.
In 1987, shortly after Randall prevailed, federal officials in Los Angeles
arrested a group of foreign student activists (seven Palestinians and a Kenyan)
and charged them as deportable on similar charges-they were alleged to be
associated with a Palestinian group that advocated the "doctrines of world
communism," the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP"). At
the time of their arrest, FBI Director William Webster testified to Congress that
a three-year FBI investigation had found no evidence of criminal or terrorist
activity, but that the individuals "were arrested because they are alleged to be
members of a world-wide Communist organization which under the McCarran
Act makes them eligible for deportation," and that "if these individuals had
been United States citizens, there would not have been a basis for their
arrest." 191
The INS District Director who authorized the deportation
proceedings confirmed that explanation, admitting that the eight aliens "were
singled out for deportation because of their alleged political affiliations with
the [PFLP]." 192 He explained that the INS sought their deportation "at the
behest of the FBI, which concluded after investigating [the eight] that it had no
basis for prosecuting [them] criminally, and urged the INS to seek their
deportation." 193
Contemporaneous FBI memoranda prepared to urge the INS to deport the
eight aliens confirm that they were targeted solely for lawful political
191. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 70 F.3d at 1053 (quoting
Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Nomination of William
H. Webster, to be Director of Central Intelligence, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 94-95 (AprilS, 9,
30, 1987; May 1, 1987)).
192. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., No. 97-1252 (U.S.), Joint
Appendix at 93 (Declaration of INS District Director Ernest Gustafson).
193. Id. at 94.
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associations and advocacy that would be fully protected if engaged in by U.S.
citizens. The memoranda consist entirely of accounts of lawful political
activity and include detailed reports on political demonstrations, meetings, and
dinners, and extensive quotations from political speeches and leaflets. Over
300 pages are devoted to tracking compulsively the distribution of PFLP
newspapers, available in public libraries throughout the United States, as if
they were illegal drugs. Agents intercepted boxes of magazines imported from
abroad at the Los Angeles airport, weighed them to estimate how many
magazines they contained, and then carefully tracked those who picked up and
distributed the magazines.
The memos repeatedly criticize the aliens' political views as "anti-US,
anti-Israel, anti-Jordan," 194 and even "anti-REAGAN and anti-MABARAK
[sic]." 195 The principal FBI report on the group admitted that the FBI's purpose
was to disrupt political activity. It identified its purpose as "to identify key
PFLP people in Southern California so that law enforcement agencies capable
of disrupting the PFLP's activities through legal action can do so," even though
the FBI had identified no illegal activities. 196 The FBI specifically urged
deportation of the alleged "leader" of the group, Khader Hamide, not because
he engaged in any criminal acts, but because he was "intelligent, aggressive,
dedicated, and shows great leadership ability."l97
In 1990, Congress repealed the immigration law provisions that made
aliens deportable for associating with groups advocating communism. 198 But
the INS continued its deportation efforts, pursuing some of the eight on routine
visa violation charges, and charging the two who were permanent residents
with having "engaged in terrorist activity" by providing material support to the
PFLP. The aliens obtained an injunction against the deportation proceedings,
successfully arguing that they had been singled out for deportation based on
First Amendment-protected activities. 199 In opposing the injunction, the
government argued that aliens e~oyed only diminished First Amendment
rights, and that therefore the INS should be permitted to single out aliens for
deportation based on their association with and support of a terrorist group,
without having to show that the conduct in any way furthered any terrorist

194. /d. at 150-51, 172-74, 181, 184, 190-91.
195. /d. at 165.
196. /d. at 142-43.
197. /d. at 152.
198. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C);
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that "communism" and other advocacy grounds had been repealed and dismissing on
justiciability grounds).
199. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.
1995).
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activity.Z00 The federal courts rejected this argument, holding that aliens in the
United States are entitled to the same First Amendment rights as citizens.201
In 1996, however, the INS persuaded Congress to repeal federal court
jurisdiction to hear cases challenging selective enforcement of the immigration
law, and the Supreme Court ruled that the case should be dismissed.202 To this
day, fifteen years after the initial arrests, the government continues to seek the
aliens' deportation, notwithstanding its initial admission that they have engaged
in no illegal or terrorist activity. From the government's perspective, that
admission is not material, because any support to a "terrorist group," even to its
wholly lawful activities, should be a legally sufficient basis for deportation. 203
In the Los Angeles deportation case, the government consistently argued
that aliens were entitled to reduced First Amendment protection, at least in the
deportation setting. 204 But as in the World War II and McCarthy era periods, its
arguments were soon extended to citizens. In the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, Congress enacted a new criminal statute making it
a crime, punishable by ten years in prison and a substantial fme, to provide
material support to a designated terrorist organization.205 Prior law had
criminalized material support of terrorist activity, which required the
government to show some connection between an individual's support and the
terrorist activity. Just as the USA PATRIOT Act later did with respect to
immigration law, the 1996 statute dispensed with the requirement that the
government prove a nexus to terrorist activity for criminal prosecutions,
making it a crime to support even the legal activities of any organization
designated as terrorist by the Secretary of State. Under this law, like the USA
PATRIOT Act, a person who supports a designated organization is liable even
if he can show that his support was designed to discourage the group from
engaging in violence, and actually had that effect. Here again, then, a theory
initially used against aliens, and defended on the ground that aliens deserve less
constitutional protection than citizens, proved to be a precursor for a similar
law directed at citizens.
One practice that one might think citizens need not worry about is the use
of secret evidence to determine the outcome of legal proceedings concerning
their liberty or property. The Confrontation Clause guarantees that anyone

200. Id. at 1064-66.
201. Id.
202. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1998).
203. As described above, the USA PATRIOT Act makes material support to
designated terrorist organizations a deportable offense. See supra text at notes 52-63.
204. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d at 1064-66
(describing government arguments for diminished First Amendment protection for aliens
facing deportation).
205. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 303(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and 8 U.S.C. § 1189). See generally Humanitarian
Law Project, Inc. v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
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tried in a criminal court has a right to confront the evidence used against him,
and the elemental due process requirement that persons be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to be heard would seem to require access to the
dispositive evidence used to take one's liberty or property. Yet the government
has for many years used secret evidence, submitted in camera and ex parte, in
immigration proceedings, and has argued that aliens are not constitutionally
entitled to confront the evidence against them even when their physical liberty
is at stake. Here, too, the government has maintained that aliens e!Uoy only
diminished constitutional protections. But here, too, the government has
recently sought to extend this practice to United States citizens.
The government's use of secret evidence against noncitizens is illustrated
by the case of Hany Kiareldeen, a Palestinian man in his 30s who came to the
United States on a student visa in 1990 and now lives in Newark, New
Jersey.2°6 In March 1998, the INS arrested Kiareldeen, charged him with
failing to maintain his student visa status, and detained him without bond,
claiming that he was a threat to national security.
Kiareldeen never saw the evidence that allegedly supported his detention
as a security threat, because the INS submitted it to an immigration judge in
camera and ex parte. The INS did give Kiareldeen an unclassified summary of
the evidence, but the summary initially disclosed only that he was allegedly
associated with terrorists and posed a threat to the Attorney General, charges so
general that Kiareldeen could not possibly rebut them.2o1
Subsequently, the INS expanded its disclosure, and ultimately revealed
three allegations: (1) that Kiareldeen was associated with an unidentified
"terrorist organization," and with other members and suspected members of
terrorist organizations, also unidentified; (2) that about a week before the
World Trade Center ("WTC") bombing, Kiareldeen hosted a meeting at his
residence in Nutley, New Jersey, where some individuals discussed plans to
bomb the World Trade Center; and (3) that "Kiareldeen expressed a desire to
murder Attorney General Janet Reno.''2°3 The summary provided no further
details. It did not, for example, identify the sources for any of these
allegations, nor explain the context or time frame for the alleged relationships
and statement.209
Kiareldeen was nonetheless able to rebut the government's case in open
court. He proved, for example, that he did not even live in the apartment where

206. This description is drawn from a fuller account, contained in David Cole, Secrecy,
Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J. L. & RELIGION 267 (2001).
207. Verified Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Attachment A, Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71
F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999) (No. 99-3925) (reproducing INS summary provided at initial
bond redetermination hearing).
208. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416 (D.N.J. 1999); Verified Petition for
Habeas Corpus Relief, Attachment E, Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999)
(No. 99-3925).
209. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 417-418.
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he supposedly hosted a meeting with World Trade Center bombers until a year
and a half after the alleged meeting took place.210 He showed that his phone
records from the time revealed no phone calls to other conspirators in the
World Trade Center case, while the conspirators' phone records showed
extensive calls among themselves. 211 And he testified that one of the sources of
secret evidence against him, his ex-wife, had made numerous false allegations
against him in the course of a custody battle over their child.212 Kiareldeen
sought to examine his ex-wife in open court, but the INS vigorously opposed
his attempts to do so, and she refused to testify about her discussions with the
FBJ.213
In the end, all seven immigration judges who examined the complete
record in Kiareldeen's case, including the government's secret evidence
presentation and Kiareldeen's open court rebuttal, rejected the government's
contention that he posed a threat to national security, and he was eventually
released-but not before he spent 19 months in jail on the basis of that secret
evidence.214
Kiareldeen is not alone. Since 1987, I have represented thirteen aliens
against whom the government has sought to use secret evidence, either to
detain or to deport them. In each case, the government claimed that the
evidence showed the aliens to be threats to national security. Yet in each case,
the aliens were eventually released by court order, either because federal courts
concluded that reliance on classified evidence was unconstitutional, or because
once the government disclosed some of the classified evidence, the alien was
able to rebut the charges in immigration court. In each case in which the
charges were disclosed,
they consisted of little more than guilt by
association. 215
In the wake of September 11, this tactic has now been extended to
domestic law affecting citizens. The Treasury Department, relying on the USA
PATRIOT Act, has seized all property and blocked all bank accounts of two
U.S.-based charities, Global Relief Foundation, Inc., and Benevolence

210. In re Kiareldeen, No. A77-025-332, slip op. at 13-14 (U.S. Immigration Ct. Apr.
2, 1999).
211. Id. at 14-15.
212. !d. at 8-9.
213. See Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F.Supp.2d 402, 417; Verified Petition for Habeas
Corpus Relief at '][22-26, Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999) (No. 993925); Verified Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Attachment Fat 2-3, Kiareldeen v. Reno,
71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999) (No. 99-3925) (reproducing decision of immigration judge
in In re Kiareldeen, No. A77-025-332, slip op. at 13-14 (U.S. Immigration Ct. Apr. 2,
1999)).
214. See In Re Kiareldeen, No. A77-025-332, (BIA Oct. 20, 1999) (dismissing the
government's appeal of the immigration judge's bond order); In Re Kiareldeen, No. A77025-332 (BIA Oct. 15, 1999) (dismissing the government's appeal of the immigration
judge's decision); In re Kiareldeen, No. A77-025-332 (U.S. Immigration Ct. Apr. 2, 1999).
215. See Cole, supra note 206.
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International Foundation, Inc. Their assets have been frozen, not based on any
showing that they have violated any law, but merely pursuant to an
investigation under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Neither corporation has even been charged with violating any law. Both
organizations, which have U.S. citizen board members, have sued, arguing that
these property seizures violate their rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendments, and the prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws.216 In March 2002, the government notified Global Relief Foundation that
it will rely on a provision of the USA PATRIOT Act to justify its actions by
presenting classified evidence in camera and ex parte to the district court in
which the seizure has been challenged.217
History reveals that the distinction between citizen and alien has frequently
been resorted to as a justification for liberty-infringing measures in times of
crisis. In the short term, the fact that measures are limited to noncitizens
appears to make them easier for the majority to accept-citizens are not asked
to sacrifice their own liberty. But the same history suggests that citizens should
be wary about relying on this distinction, because it has often been breached
before. What we are willing to do to noncitizens ultimately affects what we are
willing to do to citizens. In the long run, all of our rights are at stake in the war
against terrorism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Security is indisputably at a premium in the wake of the attacks of
September 11. There may well be a justification for sacrificing some of our
liberties if the sacrifice will make us more secure. But many of the measures
we have undertaken after September 11 follow a disturbing historical pattern,
in which we, the citizenry, sacrifice not our freedoms, but the freedoms of
noncitizens, a minority group with no vote, in the interest of preserving
citizens' security. The post-September 11 response constitutes a reprise of
some of the worst mistakes of our past. Once again, we are treating people as
suspicious not for their conduct, but based on their racial, ethnic, or political
identity. Once again, we are using the immigration power as a pretext for
criminal law enforcement, and have undertaken a mass detention campaign
directed at immigrants without probable cause that any of them are tied to the
specific threats that we face. And once again, we have authorized the
government to bypass procedures designed to distinguish the guilty from the
innocent, holding secret bearings and authorizing executive detentions that
challenge the most basic notions of fairness.

216. Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O'Neill, 1: 2002 CV 00674 (N.D. lll. 2002);
Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 1:2002 CV 00763 (N.D. lll. 2002).
217. Geoff Dougherty & Laurie Cohen, U.S. Using New Law on Secret Evidence:
Patriot Act Invoked to Fight Lawsuit by Muslim Group, Cm. TRIB., March 15, 2002, at 1.
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As politically tempting as the trade-off of immigrants' liberties for our
security may appear, we should not make it. As a matter of principle, the rights
that we have selectively denied to immigrants are not reserved for citizens.
The rights of political freedom, due process, and equal protection belong to
every person subject to United States legal obligations, irrespective of
citizenship. As a pragmatic matter, reliance on double standards reduces the
legitimacy of our struggle, and that legitimacy may be our most valuable asset,
both at home and abroad. To paraphrase John Ashcroft himself: "To those who
pit Americans against immigrants and citizens against non-citizens . . . my
message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorism."218 And as a matter of selfinterest, what we do to aliens today may well pave the way for what will be
done to citizens tomorrow. In the end, however, it is principle that should drive
us: the justice of our response should be judged by how we treat those who
have no voice in the political process. Thus far, we have performed
predictably, but not well.

218.

See Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Policy, supra note 1.
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